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Debt-For-Equity Swaps: A Phenomenon
in Transition

I.

INTRODUCTION

Debt-for-equity swap transactions' (swaps) have been touted as the
saviour of not only the heavily indebted Latin American countries
2
but also of several multinational and small regional creditor banks.
Swaps are also seen as a technique for market penetration by multinational enterprises otherwise excluded from certain industries of
debtor countries. In the last few years, the volume of swaps in the
world debt-equity market has surged, with an estimated 8 billion
dollars spent worldwide in swaps activity for 1988. 3 This was a
testimony of the perceived utility of the process by those involved.
However, since the inception of swaps, serious questions have emerged
regarding their stability, benefits, and true ability to relieve debt. In
the forefront of these questions is whether or not swaps undermine
Latin American goals of maintaining national control over the economy.
Although developed only within the last couple of years, the swap
program in Mexico has already been suspended twice due to alleged

1. Recent Development, InternationalDebt: Debt-To-Equity Swaps, 28 HARV. I1N'L L.J.
507, 507 (1987).
[Dlebt-to-Equity swaps grew out of creditor banks' desires to reduce their exposure to
debtor countries, and the perception by these countries that increased foreign direct
investment may be beneficial to their economies. In order to rid themselves of undesirable
debt, banks sell or trade their debt instruments at substantial discounts. Id. at 507-508
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Recent Development, Int'l Debt].
2. See generally Mark, Debt-Business Boom in Latin America, Eu1oMoNEY, Sept. 1987, at
81 [hereinafter Mark]; Osbom, Can This Dream Come True?, EuaoMoNY, Sept. 1987, at 74.
[hereinafter Osborn]; Ollard, The Debt Swappers, EtmooEY, Aug. 1986, at 67 [hereinafter
Ollard].
3. Truell, Cutting Losses, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1988, at 10R, col. 1.
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adverse economic impacts. 4 In addition, national laws governing swap
transactions are in a continuous state of flux in response to lessons
learned by debtor nations. These circumstances combine to create an
environment of uncertainty in which banks, investors, debtor and
creditor nations strive to protect their prospective interests.
Mexico and Brazil have encouraged swaps as a mechanism to help
reduce their outstanding national debt. 5 It has been the practice of
other debtor developing countries to project the probable impact of
their swap transactions by examining the Mexican and Brazilian
experiences both in the short and long-run. In view of the fact that
Brazil and Mexico have developed different regulatory schemes for
swaps and their individual or collective influence on other Latin
American countries, a comparison of the swap transactions in the
two countries might yield cogent indications of the future of this
activity in Latin America.
Given the perceived role of swaps in international finance, foreign
investment and reduction of outstanding debt, it is the objective of
this comment to critically assess the future of debt-equity swaps. The
current suspension of swaps by the Mexican government may suggest
significant questions about the future vitality of swap transactions in
general. Is the suspension a result of significant costs to the Mexican
economy not in any way balanced by the benefits? Is the suspension
a necessary step towards a better assessment of the facility, its legal
character or the techniques for regulations? On the other hand, the
suspensions may well be an historically induced political response to
foreign participation in certain industries. Whatever the reasons for
the suspension of the swaps, the history of foreign investment policies
in Latin America suggests that the swaps are laden with serious
stability questions. If the creditor banks are under pressure to reduce
their debt-equity ratios in order to minimize the possibility of losses,
the swaps may be a trap to the unwary.
These are all important questions which require answers. It is the
objective of this comment to examine the extent to which the swap
constitutes a stable transaction from the point of view of the creditor
banks, the foreign investors, and the governments of both the host
and the creditor nations.
4. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps in Mexico, 23 TEx. IrNr'L L.J. 443, 452-55 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps].
5. See generally id. See also Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4; Cohen & Michaels,
Brazil Plunges Into Debt-EquitySwaps, Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1988, at 18, col. I [hereinafter Cohen
& Michaels].
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To achieve this objective, this comment is divided into seven parts.
First, it begins by describing the mechanics of a debt-equity swap:
how the swap functions; who are the typical parties; what industries
are usually involved; and the typical size and frequency of the swap
transaction. Second, it examines the evolution of the debt crisis and
early responses to that crisis. Third, this comment discusses the
interplay of foreign investment policies in Latin America and current
swap regulatory trends in Mexico and Brazil. The comment then
describes the responses to swap transactions, including the regulations
of the United States as well as less formal measures of avoiding
problems from swaps. The fifth section follows with a discussion of
the costs and benefits of debt-equity swaps to the banks, the investors,
and the debtor nations, with an emphasis on implications that the
swap may have on control over key economic decisions in debtor
nations. The comment closes with a summary and conclusion anticipating potential changes in the environment for debt-equity swap
transactions and the implications of current economic and regulatory
trends for swap investors and debtor nations.
II.

WHAT IS A DEBT-EQUITY SwAP?

The Mechanics of the Transaction

A.

Debt-equity swaps6 are a relatively recent phenomenon which have
become extremely popular among Latin American countries as a way
of retiring outstanding national debt. 7 Swaps allow creditors of large
debtor nations to convert their debt holdings into equity holdings in
the debtor country.8 The basic premise of debt-equity swaps is to
retire public debt in a debtor nation by trading that debt for invest-

6. There are three basic types of debt swaps which occur in the international swap market:
debt-for-debt swaps, debt-for-equity swaps, and debt-for-currency swaps. In a debt-for-debt swap,
the debt is exchanged for another debt instrument or for some combination of debt and cash; in

a debt-for-currency swap, foreign debt is exchanged for either local currency or bonds denominated
in local currency; in a debt-for-equity swap, foreign debt is exchanged for equity or shares of
stock in a local concern. HousE Coma. ON BANKING, FINANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRs, SUBcomm.
ON INT'L FINANCE, TRADE AND MONETARY PoLicy, 100TH CONG., 2D Sass., REPORT ON AN
INTnRATIONAL D=ar MANAGEuENT Aurnoarry (Report of Patricia Wertman) 89-90 (Comm. Print
1988) [hereinafter House REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEmsNT AUTHOur].
7. Recent Development, Int'l Debt, supra note 1, at 508. Debt/equity swaps have been an

attractive alternative to debt restructuring. Id.
8.
16.

Id. Equity holdings are comprised of shares of stock, or equity in an entity. Id. at 507-
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ment in the capital stock of its companies, either public or private. 9

There are two basic types of swaps, the indirect swap and the
direct swap. In the indirect swap, a third party investor purchases

the debt from the bank on the secondary market'0 and then swaps
that debt with the debtor nation. For example, an investor might
purchase $80 million of debt (on the secondary market) from a bank
at half the face value, here $40 million, and subsequently swap the

debt with the debtor nation for $60 million in pesos. The pesos are
in turn used to purchase equity in a Mexican firm. The investor
must, of course, have the potential swap transaction approved by

the debtor nation before the transaction begins."
In order to decrease losses on these debts, banks have begun to
bypass the investors by participating directly in swap transactions.

In a direct swap, the transaction begins when a bank, usually holding
a large portfolio of LDC debt,12 applies to the debtor government

3

transaction.' 4

If approved, the bank is given
for approval of a swap
a discounted amount of local currency which they then must use to
purchase shares in a local entity. Here, a bank might exchange $80
million of outstanding Mexican debt holdings for $60 million worth
of pesos or peso-denominated bonds from the central bank of the
debtor nation.

5

The pesos received must then be used to buy stock

holdings in a Mexican enterprise worth $60 million. The $20 million
difference represents the "discount rate"' 16 charged by the debtor

nation.
9. Pando, The Mexican Debt Crisis in Perspective: Faulty Legal Structures and Aftershocks,
23 Tax. INT'L L.J. 171, 218 (1988) [hereinafter Pando].
10.

HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEmT MANAaMENT AuTHoRrry, supra note 6, at

89. Public and private loans are actively traded and sold on the international secondary market.
The secondary market developed after the announcement by Mexico in 1982 that it would suspend
payments on its outstanding debt. Id. at 80.
11. Recent Development, Int'l Debt, supra note 1, at 507. This intermediary is usually another
bank which acts as a broker in setting up the deal on the secondary loan market. Id.
12. An investor diversifies his investments to reduce risk. Webster's defines "portfolio" as:
"the securities held by an investor," "the commercial paper held by a financial house (as a
bank)." WEasma's NmnrH NEw CoU.ECiATE DinTIoNARY 917 (1983).
13. In Mexico, the government department applied to is the Ministry of Finance and Public
Credit. Comment, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt; Avoiding A Latin American Debt Revolution,
10 U. PA. J. IrN'L Bus. L. 89, 110 n.158 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Give Me Equity]. In
Brazil the applicant goes directly to the Central Bank of Brazil. Baker and McKenzie, Regional
Developments: Latin America, 22 INrr'L LAw. 845, 847 (1988) [hereinafter Baker & McKenzie].
14. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 447-48. In Mexico, the National Commission of Foreign Investment must approve the transaction. Id.
15.

HousE REPORT ON AN INTR ATIONAL DEBT MANAGEmENT AuTroarry, supra note 7, at

90.
16. Although called a discount, in fact, the "discount" represents the amount of reduction
of the outstanding debt charged by the debtor nation. This reduction equals a loss which must
be written "off" on the bank's books. For a general discussion, see infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
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The discount rate is determined according to the type of venture
proposed. 7 The amount of the discount generally depends on whether
the investment is in a sector which the government wants to promote. 8 If so, the discount may be as little as 5 or 10 percent. 19 In
effect, the government promotes a sector in which it wants to
encourage foreign investment, while the bank holding the outstanding
debt "writes off" only 5 or 10 percent of the loan amount as a loss.
If the investment is in a sector in which local control is preferred,
20
the discount may be as high as 25 percent.
The transaction, on its face, benefits all parties involved. The bank
retires a portion of its uncollectible foreign debt and can eventually
decrease its loan-loss reserves. The investor obtains equity in an entity
in the debtor nation which it may not otherwise be able to finance.
The debtor nation fosters direct foreign investment in national enterprises that it wants to encourage and discharges outstanding national debt at a reduced amount.2' The benefits of the swap, however,
may be illusory. Other persistent questions arise regarding the longterm stability of the investment from the viewpoint of the investor,
and the effect on the economic freedom of the debtor nation.
B.

The Parties

Banks, multinational firms, and individuals participate in debt
swaps. Banks seek to minimize their risk by diversifying their portfolio holdings in order to spread the risk of possible default. On the
other hand, a bank may desire to concentrate its holdings in order
to minimize their costs through simplifying administrative burdens
and focusing expertise on one debtor nation. 22
Many of the sellers of Latin American debt are small foreign
regional banks with a high percentage of loan-loss reserves, typically
50 percent or more.23 In selling its loans, these banks are attempting

17. See infra note 158 and accompanying table.
18. A. Balmaseda, D. Brill, and W. Kryzda, Substitution of the Public Debt of the Federal
Government of the United Mexican States by Investment 7-8 (May 1987) (unpublished) (available
from Goodreich, Riquelme & Associates A.C., Mexico City) [hereinafter Balmaseda].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. For example, the bank of the debtor nation would be able to retire $80 million of its
external debt for only $60 million. The investor receives $60 million in local currency to be used
to buy shares of a local concern.
22. HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNAToNAL DEBT MANAGmENrr AumoIny, supra note 6, at
83.
23. Evans, New Debtsfor Old and the Swapper is King, ETrRoMoNEY, Sept. 1987, at 72, 86
[hereinafter Evans].

259
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to decrease their mandatory loan-loss reserves 24 by disposing of the

right to collect on large but risky loans. 25 These regional banks
originally became involved in Latin American debt holdings due to
the attractive returns available, however, they often did not have the

expertise necessary to understand the possible ramifications of this
involvement. For instance, the syndicated loan contracts used for
these transactions generally contain cross-default clauses. 26 These
clauses require that once a default has been declared by one bank,
all other outstanding loans to that debtor country are automatically
in default. 27 This creates often unexpected controversies with other
larger banks who would prefer not to place the debtor nation in

default, making it difficult for the small regional bank to accelerate
the loans. 2
Another large group of institutions involved as third party investors

in swaps are multinational corporations (MNCs), 29 which may have
significant local currency needs for ongoing activities and expansion
of foreign subsidiaries. Swap transactions allow MNCs to make equity

investments in less developed countries at a lower price by purchasing
debts held by banks at a discount rate, and then swapping the
discounted debt for equity. 30 This allows the MNC to inject fresh

capital3 into its subsidiaries located in the debtor nation,32 or

24. Loan-loss reserves refers to a gradual building up of a sum of money set aside to protect
the stability of a bank in case of default on debt. Kuczynski, The Outlook for Latin American
Debt, FoRmoN AFF., 129, 131 (Fall 1987) [hereinafter Kuczynski].
25. Increasing loan-loss reserves results in loss to the bank. When Citicorp increased its loanloss reserves against Latin American loans by $3 billion, the decision to do so resulted in a $2.6
billion loss to the bank that quarter. JoiNT Comm. ON FoRoGN AsnAms AND FoRmoN RmATIONS,
100H CoNG., 2D Sss., TwNTY-EIomas MaXIco-UNIT= STATES INTERPARliAMENTARY CONFEREicE, 201 (Joint Comm. Print 1988) [hereinafter I
asARuiAmrARY CoNsCaErca] (report of
Glennon J. Harrison and Patricia A. Wertman). As the secondary market price for Latin American
loans has decreased, however, banks with Latin American debt holdings, have had to hedge against
future losses. As the price decreases on the secondary market, additional increases in Latin
American reserves are required. Id. at 210.
26. Note, Exchange Controls and Foreign Loan Defaults: Force Majeure as an Alternative
Defense, 71 IowA L. REv. 1499 (1986).
27. Id.
28. An acceleration clause in a loan contract is one providing for the advancement of the
date of payment under specified circumstances. Wmsrmt's TB=p INmTRNATIONAL DICTIONARY 10
(16th ed. 1976).
29. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 458.
30.

HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNATiONAL DEBT MANAGEMNT AuTorrry, supra note 6, at

83.
31. See infra notes 262-66 and accompanying text (discussing fresh capital and additionality).
32. Evans, supra note 23, at 86. For example, Co. X wants to invest in a new subsidiary in
Mexico and to own that subsidiary. Co. X is allowed the right to collect $1 million in Mexican
debt on the international secondary loan market at 60% of its face value ($600,000). The particular
government discount used in this example is 5%, so the Mexican government will pay the Co. X
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to make investments in new areas. 3
For example, the debt may be bought by a multinational corporation from a bank or through a broker on the secondary market at
as much as 50 percent of its face value. The loan is then exchanged
with the Central Bank for a minimum of 75 percent of the face
value of the debt in pesos. 34 The pesos are then exchanged for shares
of stock in businesses within the debtor nation.
Governments tend to exclude nationals from swap activity. For
instance, in Brazil, regulations limit participation in swaps to nonresident foreign creditors.3 5 This regulation effectively creates tension
among nationals who wish to compete in the market, the host
country's government, and the foreign investor adding to potential
instability. In Mexico, participation has been limited to holders of
debt, non resident entities, and individuals.3 6 Although Mexico has
passed legislation recently to enable Mexican nationals to participate
in swap transactions, the regulations governing the procedure for
their participation has not yet been placed into effect.
C.

The Investment Industries
The types of industries involved in swap conversions vary widely
with the priorities of the debtor country and with the desires of
the investor. 37 Some sectors, however, such as telecommunications
and natural resource extraction, remain closed to swap transac-

subsidiary in Mexico the equivalent of $950,000 in pesos for the debt. Co. X then purchases
$950,000 worth of shares in a Mexican company. This produces a savings to Co. X of $350,000,
the difference between the amount spent on the secondary market and the amount of pesos
allowed for the retirement of the $1 million in Mexican debt. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra
note 4, at 457 (describing an example put forth by the Director of Mexico's Foreign Investment
Commission, Jaime Alvarez Soberanis).
33. U.S. based Citicorp, which transacts many of the swap deals, has indicated that one of
the most important advantages of this type of transaction is that outsiders will probably manage
their pesos better than the debtor country did. Ollard, supra note 2, at 69.

34.

House

REPORT ON AN INTERNATiONAL

D=r

MANAGEmENT

AuTmoaRn, supra note 6, at

90.
35. Under Resolution 1460, the only types of debts that qualify for conversion are: (a) foreign
debt which originates from a Deposit Facility Agreement executed between the Central Bank of
Brazil and non resident creditor banks; (b) debt represented by voluntary deposits made under
previous conversion plans under Resolutions 230 and 432; (c) and debt that has yet to mature.
Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 847.
36. Although originally limited to non resident individuals, amendments to § 5.11 of the New
Money Agreement, allows Mexican individuals to participate in debt-equity swaps, thus effectively
allowing nationals to compete. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 453-54.
37. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 462. However, as of May 1987, most
swaps in Mexico were in the areas of the motor vehicle industry (52%), metal working and
mechanical industries (11%), tourism (9%), electronics (5%), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (5%),
and agro-industry (3%). Id.
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tions.38 Most investment bankers headquartered in the United States
39
execute swap transactions in exchange for equity in foreign banks.
This is because of U.S. SEC Regulation K40 and the familiarity
that bankers have with the banking business. On the other hand,
due to negative experiences of investments in Latin American banks
in the past, some bankers have been surprisingly unwilling to
consider investments in foreign banks. 41 They feel more comfortable
investing in hotels, fishing fleets, electrical companies, and the
like. 42 The question this poses is what effects this expansion into
unknown areas may have on the economic stability of the foreign
debtor nation.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEBT CRISIS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SWAPs

A.

Patterns of Foreign Investment and the Emergence of a Debt
Crisis

Large debtor nations often face conflicting goals of servicing
their debt obligations while trying to stimulate their national econ-

38. Id. at 451. For example, petrochemical, mining, electrical, railroad, and telecommunications, all of which were protected against foreign investment under such earlier legislation as the
1973 Foreign Investment Law, and the Andean Pact, are still guarded. Also included in this list
of reserved sectors are those that are reserved for 100% Mexican ownership, such as, radio,
television, bus and air transports, and gas distribution. Id. Although the percentage of foreign
investment in some of these industries is restricted, when combined with those industries that allow
100% ownership, it is possible that the cumulative effect will be a majority of foreign shareholders.
39. See generally, Evans, supra note 23, at 89. Some banks prefer investing in other banks,
while others prefer to stay uninvolved in foreign bank holdings and prefer other investment
opportunities. Id.
40. Id. at 86-90. The Securities and Exchange Commission enacted Regulation K, "International Banking Operations," 12 CFR Part 211, to restrict the foreign industries that U.S. banks
may invest in. Regulation K limits the amount and types of foreign investments that U.S. banks
may engage in by limiting the types of industries that may be invested in. Due to the large
amounts involved in swaps, an average of $10 million or more, some bankers feel more comfortable
investing in a familiar field. The average size of the debt-equity swap is still unclear. Different
institutions have different figures on it. Salomon Brothers has indicated that its average deal is
approximately $7 million. Over a two year period Mexico engaged in 23 swap transactions totaling
approximately $300 million, indicating that the average size exceeds $10 million. House R9PORT
ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMNT AuTrorry, supra note 6, at 81 n.167.
41. Evans, supra note 23, at 99. One such bank is Morgan Guaranty which has had at least
one bad experience investing in a foreign bank and prefers not to repeat it. Id.
42. Id. at 104. For example, in Mexico, approximately 25% of the swap transactions have
occurred in the automobile industry and another 40% in the tourist industry. Id. at 109. Citicorp
has been planning to invest in a fishing fleet in Chile. Security Pacific Bank bought a Chilean
electrical company. Amex announced plans in March of 1987 to swap $100 million in Mexican
loans for equity in seven hotels. Id.

262
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omy. In Latin American countries, interest payments on outstanding debt consume such a high percentage of export earnings that
there is not sufficient profits left to support the costs of manufacturing more exports. The result is that these countries are forced
to continually borrow more funds to service the debt of their
existing loans, creating a cycle of debt dependency. In order to
break this cycle, it is necessary for a country to experience enough
economic growth to allow both servicing their debt obligations and
43
recycling money back into the economy.
Latin American nations rely on increased commodity exports to
create economic growth. 44 Although exporting manufactured goods
may generate a greater revenue of foreign currency, harsh manufacturing standards imposed by developed nations effectively preclude importation of Latin American goods into the developed
nations.4 5 As economic growth slows worldwide, commodity ex46
porters face an increasingly shrinking market for their goods.
Without increased income from exports, there is little hope of
obtaining the economic growth necessary for debtor nations to
effectively service their existing debts, not to mention building up
a broader, more sophisticated manufacturing base. 4
Latin American countries cannot continue to borrow large sums
to service their debts. Instead, these debtor nations must find

43. Interest due on loans for Latin American countries during 1982-85 was approximately
$30 billion a year. This amount represents about 30% of export earnings annually. Another $10
billion a year was added in bond obligations. This represents a net outflow of approximately $20
billion annually in interest payments, exceeding inflow from loans and foreign direct investment.
Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 140.
44. Most of the Latin American countries, including Mexico, are commodity-producing
countries. Mexico's primary commodity is oil the price of which continue to remain depressed.
JoiNT REPORT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND rn DEBT PROBM, infra note
58, at 26-28 (essay by K. Morr).
45. For a discussion of economic interdependence among nations see generally, Yelpaala, The
Lome Conventions and the Political Economy of the African-Caribbean-PacificCountries: A
CriticalAnalysis of the Trade Provisions 13 N.Y.U. J. oF INT'L L. AND PoLrrcs, 807 (1981).
46. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 136. GNP growth has steadily declined since 1950 both in
first world countries and in Latin America. In the O.E.C.D., 1950-59 growth stood at 6%; 196069 at 5.1%; 1979-79 at 3.2%; and 1980-86 at 2.2%. In Latin America the percentage of GNP
growth has similarly declined, from 1950-59 at 5.9% to 1980-86 at 1.8% growth. Merchandise
export growth has also declined in the O.E.C.D. countries and in Latin America. In the O.E.C.D.
countries, from 1950-59 at 10.3% to from 1980-86 at 3.6%; and in Latin America from 5.6%
during 1950-59 to 1.8% in the period 1980-86. This problem for Latin American countries is
exacerbated further by the realization that while exports have been declining, the percentage of
annual exports that reflect the amount of interest payments on outstanding debt was 40% from
1980-86. Id.
47. Id. at 90-92. See also Hormats, The World Economy Under Stress, FoamoN AF. 455
(1985).
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alternative means. 48 Since neither more borrowing nor more exporting appears to be a reasonable alternative in Latin America, 49

swaps have been utilized to stimulate foreign direct investment,
injecting fresh foreign capital into the country, and retire outstand50
ing "public debt" at the same time.

B.

Path to Crisis: The Mexican Example

The Mexican debt crisis is representative of experiences in other
developing countries. 5 ' Facing increasing financial pressures and
decreasing cash reserves, in August of 1982, Mexico announced
that it could no longer service its debt obligations and asked for a
90-day extension from its creditors.5 2 Mexico suspended all debt

payments for a period of three months while it began negotiations
for rescheduling the debt payments.5 3 Although Mexico had pre-

viously had difficulties in meeting its debt obligations 5 4 never had
so much money and so many creditors been involved. 5
Years before Mexico announced that it could no longer service
its debt obligations, the mechanisms which eventually precipitated
the debt crisis were already in place. Legislation allowing the

President to obtain loans without legislative approval5 6 made it
possible to circumvent constitutional restrictions on executive bor-

48. Conrow, StructuralReform and the Debt Strategy: The Mexican Case, 18 CAL. W. INT'L
L.J. 21, (1987) [hereinafter Conrow]. Conrow points out that debtor countries must increase their
domestic savings and non debt financial flows. Id. Conrow further points out that although some
foreign financing to supplement savings is necessary to achieve rapid economic growth, it is also
necessary to avoid increasing the debt at a pace exceeding the ability of that country to service
that debt. Id.
49. Id.
50. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 444. Section 5.11 of the 1985 Mexican
Restructuring Agreement opened the door for debt-equity swaps in Mexico. Id.
51. Comment, Give Me Equity, supranote 13, at 94 n.38. Most of Latin American outstanding
foreign debt is debt owed to banks. Id.
52. Id. at 94-95. In August of 1982, Mexico's outstanding foreign debt exceeded $80 billion
U.S. and 30% of that $80 billion was due to be paid that year. As it had exhausted savings
reserves, Mexico notified the IMF, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman
of the Federal Reserve Board of its planned moratorium on debt payments. Id.
53. Id. at 98.
54. Id. at 95. In 1976 Mexico faced a similar problem though the ramifications were not
as severe. At least one author has pointed out that Latin American countries have borrowed
and defaulted periodically since they gained their independence in the 1820's. Id. at 95 n.44
(citing D. DELAMAiDE, DEar SHOCK: Tan FULL STORY OF THE WvoRD CREDIT Ciusis 232-51
(1985)).
55. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 89, 95 (1988).
56. Pando, supra note 9, at 177-78.
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rowing power.

7

Moreover, credit was cheap during the 1970s for

many of the Latin American countries.5 8 Much of the debt accumulated during this time was borrowed at rates below the rate of
inflation.5 9 Many of the loans to Mexico, however, used floating
interest rates, 60 resulting in Mexican repayment obligations becoming controlled by conditions prevailing in global capital markets.

Gradually, the amount of interest paid annually on the public debt
came to consume nearly one-half of Mexico's export earnings. 61
The "public debt" 62 of Mexico is divided between the government
debt and that of the paraestatal sector. 63 The paraestatal sector
consists of agencies and departments which the government owns
in whole or in part. 64 During the oil boom of the 1970s, the
Mexican government allowed many paraestatalesto borrow inor-

dinate amounts of money on the international market. 65 At that

57. Id. at 175. Article 73-VIII of the Mexican constitution restricts the Executive's power
to incur debt. It allows Congress:
To fix the bases upon which the President may borrow on the credit of the Nation;
to approve such loans and to acknowledge and order payment of the national debt.
No loan may be affected except for the execution of works which directly produce
an increase in public revenues, unless they are undertaken for the purposes of
currency regulation, conversion operations or loans contracted for during an emergency declared by the President....

Id.
This provision seems to indicate that some cooperation is necessary between the Congress and
the President when taking out loans. However, Pando points out that in reality, the President
does not request the approval of Congress before taking out loans. Id. at 177.
58. SUBCOMM. ON EcoNow.c GRowTH, TRADE, AND TAXEs, 100T CONG., 1ST SEASs.,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM 49 (Joint Comm. Print
1987) [hereinafter JOINT REPORT ON ECONoaC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT

PROBLEM] (essay by C. Bogdanowicz-Bindert).
59. Id. With interest rates negative in real terms, it made sense to borrow heavily. The
possibility for repayment was high if the money borrowed was invested into productive sectors.
In reality, however, only approximately half of the amount borrowed was ever invested into
productive areas. Id.
60. Many of these loans were linked to either the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
or the U.S. Prime rate for the first time. LIBOR is the cost of the funds plus a premium for
the credit risk of the borrower. The premium varies according to the credit risk of the borrower
involved. R. Weerasinghe, Note on the Eurocurrency Markets, 5-6 (rev. ed. April, 1975)
(unpublished paper prepared for class discussion; available from Harvard Business School).
61. From 1980-86, interest payments on outstanding Latin American debt were approximately 40%70 of export earnings. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 136.
62. Most third world country debt can be separated into public and private debt. Public
debt is usually debt incurred by the government itself, while private debt is that debt incurred
by corporations borrowing on the international debt market. See generally Pando, supra note
9, at 182-85.
63. Pando, supra note 9,,.at 183 n.76.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 184. Although the paraestatalsectors are owned in whole or in part by the
Mexican government, in reality, they have separate legal personalities. This enabled creditors
to consider each paraestatalseparately to evaluate its viability as a borrower. Id.
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time, Mexico was exporting large amounts of oil and petroleum

products at high prices. Investors perceived Mexican paraestatales
as a good credit risk and banks were only too willing to lend large

amounts.6 6 This served to exacerbate the already large Mexican
debt.
The other portion of public debt was incurred to develop industrial sectors which would generate manufactured goods for exportation. Increased manufactured exports fuel economic growth by

increasing revenues without depleting the finite source of natural
resources. Mexico's goal in this increase of production capability

was one of self-sufficiency, perceived as necessary to lift Mexico
from Third World status.6 7
Mexico's ability to repay loans now depends, in large part, on

the international price of its commodity exports, primarily oil.68 In

1981, global oil prices began to fall along with oil exports. 69 During

this period the oil-producing countries, including Mexico, continued
to borrow heavily. Banks continued to perceive Mexico as a "good

risk" and thus were eager to oblige. 70 Simultaneously, the 7interest
rate on Mexico's floating interest rate loans began to rise. '
With double-digit inflation occurring in the United States, in
October 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board tightened the growth
of the money supply as a remedial measure. As a result, global

interest rates rose sharply. 72 Latin American loans with floating
interest rates, originally taken out at rates of 4-5 percent, had to

66. Id.
67. The increased manufacturing base that was envisioned never came to pass in Mexico.
After funds were loaned to Mexico, too often those funds were invested in other countries.
See infra note 300 and accompanying text.
68. Tapia, Mexico's Debt Restructuring: The Evolving Solution, 23 CoLum. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1, 2 (1984) [hereinafter Tapia].
69. Id. at 3 n.3. During 1981, oil exports dropped from 1.5 billion barrels a day to 1.1
million barrels a day. Major customers, such as France, Japan, and the U.S. deferred orders.
At the same time oil prices began to fall. Id. Recession hit the industrialized nations at
approximately the same time which served to further exacerbate the problem. Other causes
can be attributed to the second OPEC oil price hike of 1979-80, decreasing commodity sales,
and higher real interest rates. JoINr REPORT ON ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
AND TERDEBT PROBLEM, supra note 58, at 26-27 (essay by K. Morr).
70. Id. at 49 (essay by Bogdanowicz-Bindert). Although exports had dropped, the level
of imports had risen and had not yet tapered off, resulting in a severe trade imbalance which
adversely affected Mexico's balance of payments. This further precipitated the debt crisis.
Pando, supra note 9, at 185.
71. Tapia, supra note 68, at 4.
72.

JOINT REPORT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND TaE DEBT PROBLEM,

supra note 58, at 49 (essay by Bogdanowicz-Bindert). Beginning in 1979, the Federal Reserve
Board battled inflation in the U.S. with a tight money supply which sent interest rates soaring.
Pando, supra note 9, at 186 n.91.
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be repayed at rates of 15-20 percent. 73 Inevitably, Mexico turned

to short-term private financing to meet its debt payments, creating
even more debt. 74 The debt crisis had begun.
C.

The Creditors' Response to the Debt Crisis: Restructuring,

the Baker Plan, and the IMF.
The Third World debt crisis led to a variety of responses. 75 As
the United States holds a large proportion of the outstanding Latin
American debt, a default by a Latin American country could

threaten financial stability in the United States if not the world.
The overall economic and political impact cannot be ignored. In

order to prevent further instability, the primary response of the
creditor nations has been the immediate avoidance of default.
The principal tool used by creditors to avoid default has been
the restructuring of debt. "Restructuring debt" involves lengthen-

ing the time period over which the debt can be paid while reducing
the periodic payment amount. 76 This allows the debtor country an
extended period of time to increase domestic savings and accelerate

growth in exports. 77 The first restructuring of the Mexican debt
was completed in 1983.78
Three issues were addressed during the 1983 restructuring negotiations. First, Mexico asked for $5 billion from its commercial
bank lenders to contribute to a new money facility79 which would

73. Pando, supra note 9, at 186.
74. Id.
75. These responses included restructuring of existing debt, attempts at the development
of structural changes instituted within the debtor countries to create a stronger economic base
as well as lending more money to make interest payments on the existing loans. See infra
notes 76, 85, 92-97 and accompanying text.
76. House REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT Au~oarrY, supra note 6,
at 84.
77. JoiNT REPORT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,
supra note 58, at 50 (essay by Bogdanowicz-Bindert).
78. Pando, supra note 9, at 207. The first restructuring agreement contained a provision
that allowed rescheduling of the public debt that was to mature between August 23, 1982, and
December 31, 1984. Under this agreement, Mexico was to make quarterly installment payments
from 1987-1990 on the debt which was to mature during the 1982-1984 period. It also committed
the Mexican government to support the private sector debt crisis. The principle effort in this
regard was the creation of the Trust for the Coverage of Foreign Exchange Risks (FICORCA).
Id. at 207 n.233.
79. Under the agreement, Mexico's lenders granted credits in varying currencies for a
total amount of $5 billion. See Infra note 173 for definition of credits. The credit amount
was to be repaid in thirteen periodic payments. Credits were tied to both fixed and variable
rates. The new money facility agreement also provided for choice of forum: New York, High
Court of London, courts of the Federal District of Mexico, and jurisdictions where the main
offices of each creditor were located. Choice-of-law provisions designated the law of New
York, but excluded New York conflicts-of-law provisions. Pando, supra note 9, at 200-201.
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help Mexico stay current with its interest payments.8 0 Banks were

reluctant to lend, however, and only did so upon assurances that
all of Mexico's lenders would participate and that the new loans

have much higher rates than those extended previously.8' Second,
public Mexican debt payments for the next six months were to be

rescheduled over an eight year period.8 2 This rescheduling was felt
essential if Mexico was to continue to meet its debt obligations.

Finally, the International Monetary Fund 3 (IMF) was to disburse
84
$3.9 billion over a three year period.
This restructuring was actually short-term in nature as only
interest payments were rescheduled, leaving the principal amount
to be rescheduled at a later time.8 5 Further, it has been argued that
restructuring only works well if the global economy is expanding
at a rate of 3 percent or more and if industrial countries are open
to increased exports from lesser developed countries.8

6

With in-

creasing problems of exportation and declining global economy,
Mexico's choices did not look good. Since the 1983 restructuring
did nothing to alleviate long-term debt, it was inevitable that new
approaches would be considered.

1985 proved to be a year of unusual crisis for Mexico. By July,
the public sector deficit had exceeded limits imposed for the entire
year.8 7 During September, earthquakes hit Mexico, ravaging Mexico
City. 8 The IMF extended further funding and the creditors agreed

80. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 90.
81. Tapia, supra note 68, at 6. Rates for the new money facility were fixed at prime plus
2 1/4% or LIBOR plus 2 1/2% and included a management fee of 1 1/4%. Id. at 6 n. 5.
82. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 96. A new restructuring and money
facility became necessary in 1984 in the amount of $3.8 billion U.S. Id. at 96 n. 51.
83. Pando, supra note 9, at 193-96. The International Monetary Fund was founded to
aid member nations in procuring short-term financing. The role of the IMF has greatly
expanded over the years. Although the IMF aids debtor countries in securing loans, thereby
alleviating their debt problems, debtor counties have found some of the IMF restrictions and
requirements for these loans to be interventionist in nature. IMF assistance is conditioned
upon the implementation of certain performance quotas and fiscal policies which focus on
medium- and long-range structural changes. It is interesting to note that IMF policies are
based on monetarist and Keynesian economic views, which do not experience universal
acceptance in Latin America. Developing countries fear that these requirements undermine
their sovereignty. This is particularly true with Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs) which are
typically used in large debtor nations. With SBAs, the IMF is allowed to dictate the economic
policy of the country receiving the funds. Id.
84. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 96.
85. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
86. JorNT REPORT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,
supra note 58, at 50 (essay by Bogdanowicz-Bindert).
87. Pando, supra note 9, at 216.
88. Id.
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to reschedule the public sector debt of the United Mexican States,
89
the Department of the Federal Districts, and of thirty paraestatals.
All of this debt, originally scheduled to mature between 1985 and
1990, was rescheduled to mature between 1986 and 1990.90 Mexico
also agreed to modify existing agreements to reschedule debt maturing between 1982 and 1984, to mature between 1987 and 1990. 91
In October of 1985, at the IMF joint session, James Baker, then
Secretary of the United States Treasury, unveiled the "Baker Plan.'"92
The plan attempted to solve the debt problem largely through new
lending plans to Latin America. 93 The plan sought three objectives.
First, debtor nations were to implement far-reaching structural
changes which would enable them to decrease spending. Second,
the World Bank and all remaining institutions of multilateral development were to grant credits to finance sectoral/structural changes
within the debtor nation. Third, bank loans of $20 billion were to
be made available to the main debtors during the three years
following. 94 This plan was not fully implemented, 95 however, largely
because lending has not reached the $20 billion level projected and
the economic growth anticipated has not occurred. 96 Aside from its
implementation, the Baker Plan has been criticised as not providing
97
adequate funds to achieve its goals.

89.

Id. For a list of those paraestatalentities involved see id. at 216 n. 274.

90. Id.
91.

92.

Id. at 216-17.
JOINT REPORT ON ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,

supra note 58, at 42 (essay by A. Reifman).
93. Id. Under the Baker Plan, it was expected that the development banks such as the
World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank would provide $9 billion in new loans
over a three year period, while the commercial banks were expected to loan an additional $20
billion over a three year period. Id.
94. Pando, supra note 9, at 217.
95. Id.
96. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 135.
97. The funds allotted to Mexico under the plan alone comprise 40%1o of the funds allotted
to all 15 heavily indebted countries for 1987. JOINT REPORT ON EcONOMIc DEVELOPMENT IN
LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,

supra note 58, at 42. (essay by A. Reifman).

On March 10, 1989, United States Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced a new
debt-reduction policy for the Third World. The proposed policy favors the forgiveness of Latin
American debt as opposed to additional lending. Included in the plan are three types of debtreduction transactions. The first type involves debt that would be swapped for bonds of lower
face value. In the second, the bank debt would be traded for bonds with an equal face value
but which carry a lower interest rate. In the third, the bank debt would be traded for partownership of local business entities.
Countries such as Mexico and Venezuela, which can show that they are recapturing capital
lost due to capital flight would be entitled to special measures of debt-reduction. Among these
special measures are the following: the right to use a percentage of their loans to rebuy bank
debt or to guarantee bonds that will be swapped for debt at a discount; additional guarantees
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On July 22, 1986, the IMF and Mexico came to an agreement for
$12 billion in new financing. 98 In this agreement, Mexico succeeded
in obtaining loans sufficient to finance Mexico's interest obligations
while still allowing the Mexican economy to grow at a 3-4 percent
annual rate. Mexico also demanded to be assured that additional
funding would be available should the price of petroleum sink
further. 99 These concessions are significant as Mexico had been unsuccessful in obtaining identical demands in the past, suggesting
increased efforts by the IMF to avoid loan default. Mexico also
sought the "write off" of part of its outstanding debt. 1°° However,
this was denied and Mexico accepted the increased debt amount. 01'
These crises-management solutions are necessarily shortsighted, and
the long-term effect of the solutions may be more damaging than
the problems which they were intended to remedy. The dependency
which debtor nations attempted to avoid has become even more
burdensome as the debtor nations continue borrowing more money
to pay off existing outstanding loans. The ongoing frustration of
inability to expand manufacturing exports has left debtor nations
dependent upon their commodity exports which are conditioned upon
global prices. The crisis suggests that debt is driving debtor countries
into deeper foreign dependency, something Latin American countries
always avoided. The ramifications of the crisis and the responses to
it not only affect debtor countries, however, but creditor countries,
investors, and the stability of foreign investment as well.
III.

TE INTERPLAY OF FoREiGN INVESTMENT WITH LAWS AND
REGULATIONS GOVERNING SWAPS

During the last decade, Latin American countries have experienced
increasing foreign investment. Possibility for conflict arises where a
debtor nation which is in need of the economic growth that foreign
investment may bring, is unwilling to relinquish control over the
entities invested in. This conflict exists because generally, along with

that interest would be paid on loans for which interest or principal had been; Japanese loans
to be used to increase reserves or to buy back debt. Mossberg & Truell, U.S. Strategy on
World Debt Faces Hurdles, WALL STmnnr J., March 13, 1989, at A4, col.I.
98. Bailey, The Mexican Economy as 1987 Begins, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 31 (1987). The
IMF agreed to a number of Mexico's demands that it had rejected in the past. This concession
on the part of the IMF was due, in part, to pressure from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board
which was concerned about the possibility of another Mexican debt default. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 32.
101. Id.
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foreign investment comes foreign ownership and control. Often the

debtor nation is forced to compromise its desire for independence in
favor of increasing foreign investment. As swaps entail some com-

promise between the two goals, it is likely that debtor nations will
continue to impose regulations regarding industries eligible for foreign

investment, the amount of allowed investment, the control that is
relinquished to foreign investors, and the repatriation of capital and
profits.

A. Patterns of Regulation of Foreign Investment in Latin
America
1. InternationalForeign Investment Initiatives: The Andean

Pact Principles
In hopes of breaking the cycle of dependency, some Latin American
countries agreed in 1969 to form the Andean Pact.10 2 The Andean

Pact was created to facilitate the goal of breaking economic and
financial dependency upon other nations by enabling member nations
to plan and develop their own manufacturing sectors. °0 This, in
turn, was to facilitate increased manufactured exports, allowing the
country to service its debts without stifling economic growth. Al-

though only Bolivia, Chile,
into the

agreement, 0 5

°4

Columbia, Ecuador, and Peru entered

the impact of the Andean Pact has been felt

throughout all Latin America. The impact of the Andean Pact
Agreement has been seen in Mexico in the recent past, and is still

102. The Cartagena Agreement, along with its ancillary rulings and regulations, has become
known as the Andean Pact. Kuczynski, PlannedDevelopment in the Andean Group: Industrial
Policy and Trade Liberalization, in THE ANDEAN GROUP: TRADE, INDusTRy AND FoRmotN
INvESTMENT 1 (1973) [hereinafter Kuczynski, PlannedDevelopment].
103. Id. at 2. The Andean Pact's Cartagena Agreement seeks to plan manufacturing in
neighboring countries to avoid duplication and to better allocate scarce resources. The Agreement also seeks to liberalize trade within the region, coordinate the external tariffs, and
implement joint industrial planning. Id. at 4. The most complex of these is joint industrial
planning. The list of basic industries sought to be planned include: iron and steel, metallurgy,
machine and tools, motor vehicles, farm machinery, food processing, chemicals, petrochemicals,
electrical engineering, electronics, and pulp and paper. Id. at 12. Provisions are made for the
submission of detailed plans, the search for financing, and a time allotment in which to start
production. Id. at 16.
104. GENERAL AccouNTmo OFFCE, REPORT TO CONGRESS By THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES,

U.S. DmEcT

INVEsTMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA'S ANDEAN COMMON

MARKET at i (1977) [hereinafter COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT]. Chile has withdrawn from
the Andean Pact, indicating that it cannot adhere to the Andean Pact's restrictive stance on
foreign investment. Id.
105. Kuczynski, PlannedDevelopment, supra note 102, at 1.
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seen in Brazil today. Until 1984, Mexico followed a policy of "Mexicanization" which limited foreign investment, excluded foreign participation in certain industries and limited foreign participation in

others. °6 In Brazil, there remains today considerable emphasis on
the retention of control over key economic sectors. °7
One of the principal objectives of the Pact was to develop a
common market among its members. 0 8 This objective works in
harmony with another prime concern of the Andean Pact: influencing
the course of industrial development in Latin America.'19 The Pact
allows Latin American countries to work together toward the common goal of industrial independence by allowing them to better
allocate scarce industrial resources." 0
One of the key concerns of the Pact is the possible negative impact
that direct foreign investment may have upon Latin America."'
Decision 24,12 ratified on December 31, 1970, outlines many of the

basic principles involved in the regulation of foreign capital investments."

3

Decision 24 recognizes that the contribution of foreign

106. Mexicanization refers to the process whereby Mexican ownership was required to be
increased in an entity usually to at least 51'7, thereby limiting the maximum allowable amount
of foreign ownership to 49%. Maviglia, Mexico's Guidelines for Foreign Investment: The
Selective Promotionof Necessary Industries,80 Am. J. INT'L L. 281, 288 n.51 (1986) [hereinafter
Maviglia]. Examples of industries where investment was thus restricted to 49% ownership were
mining, petrochemicals, railroads, and public utilities. Examples of industries where foreign
investment was prohibited were banking, insurance, bonding, and investment businesses. Id.
at 287 n.42. The 1973 Foreign Investment Law promulgated the above legislation regarding
direct investment in Mexico. Id. at 290. The 1973 Foreign Investment Law limited foreign
participation in the management of a corporation to the proportion of foreign capitalization
used in the venture. It also established 49%-51% ownership in favor of Mexican participation
as the minimum. Id. The policy underlying the 1973 Foreign Investment Law was changed
dramatically by the 1984 Guidelines for Foreign Investment, which sought to actively promote
foreign investment in selected areas. Id. at 294.
107. Business Perspective, Foreign Investment Climate in Brazil 10 U. PA. J. OF INT'L Bus.
L. 161, 165 (1988) [hereinafter Busmnrss PRzsEcTnrvE].
108. Id. See also Kuczynski, PlannedDevelopment, supra note 102, at 1.
109. Kuczynski, Planned Development, supra note 103, at 2.
The pact seeks to determine what is to be manufactured, where it is to be manufactured, and
how much internal competition will be allowed. Id.
110. Id. at 3.
111. See generally Huelin, Investment in the Andean Group in THE ANDEAN GROUP:
TRADE, INDusTRY AND FOREIGN INvEsTmENT 20-21 (1973) [hereinafter Huelin].
The Andean Pact Junta, an administrative group, has been vigorous in imposing regulations
regarding foreign capital. Id. at 19-20. The Junta hands down decisions which become law
upon adoption by the Ministerial Commission and ratification by individual member countries.
Id.
112. Id. at 20. Decision 24 was modified by Decision 103 which increased the amount of
profits that were allowed to foreign investors. See CoMFrROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note
104, at 14 n.l.
113. Huelin, supra note 111, at 20.
The main features of Decision 24 are outlined below:
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technology and capital is important to the economic growth of Latin

America, but only to the extent that such contribution is effective
to the attainment of the goals of self-sufficiency and maintaining
national control.1 1 4 Foreign investors are limited to increases in capital

and are not allowed to control the entity." 5 The overriding principle
involved is that of control."

6

Since foreign investors are allowed to

contribute capital but not to gain control, it follows that foreign
7
capital may only be used to acquire non voting stock."

Under Decision 24, host countries reserve the right to exclude
foreign investment from public sector industries, especially from the
industries of natural resource extraction, public services, and communication."" Foreign investment in these areas is felt to defeat the
Latin American goal of maintaining control over those sectors which
are politically sensitive and which spur economic growth." 9 Decision

1. Host countries reserve the right to exclude foreign investment in specific sectors
of the economy, such as extractive industries, public services and socially sensitive
activities; and also to exclude specific investments if they seem superfluous or
undesirable.
2. Foreign capital should, as a general principle, be phased out over given periods,
either completely or down to minority holdings. Foreign companies that do not
accept the phasing-out principle will not be eligible for the advantages available to
national companies, and will be unable to engage in certain activities.
3. There shall be no take-overs of national firms by foreign interests, except in
special circumstances such as the avoidance of bankruptcy; foreign investors may
acquire an interest in national companies only when this represents an increase in
capital, and provided it does not mean that they gain control. Phase-out still applies.
4. Companies must have free access to foreign technology, capital equipment, raw
materials and working capital, all at normal international cost; there may be no
agreements binding companies to acquire their needs from specific sources or at
inflated costs, and none limiting their right to export their products at any part of
the world.
5. Foreign capital may be freely repatriated, and profits derived from it may be
remitted within certain limits; reinvested profits count as new foreign capital and
are subject, as such, to the regulations.
Id. at 21.
114. COMPTROLLER GENERAL REPORT, supra note 104, at 40.
See also Huelin, supra note 111, at 21, ".. .Foreign investors may acquire an interest in
national companies only when this represents an increase in capital, and provided it does not
mean that they gain control." Id.
115. Id. at 21.
116. "Control" is the "application of policies and procedures for directing, regulating and
coordinating production, administration and other business activities in a way to achieve the
objectives of the enterprise." WEBsTER'S THIR NEw INTERNAToNAL DicTIoNARY 496 (16th
ed. 1976).
117. However, not all types of stock have the same rights. Among other differences,
common shares have voting rights and preferred shares carry no voting rights.
118. Huelin, supra note 111, at 22-23.
119. Id. With extraction, the fear is that foreign corporations will be able to accelerate or
decelerate investment and production thereby controlling a large sector of Latin American
export economy. It is felt that the state should control the disposition of non renewable
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24 also limits foreign investment in any one company to 49 percent
or less.1 20 Take-overs of national firms by foreign interests are prohibited. 21 Moreover, the decision encourages the complete phase-out
of foreign investment.12 This phase-out principle allows host coun2
tries to ensure that national investors are allowed to participate. 1
If the foreign owned shares are subsequently sold to a national
investor, the capital may be remitted in its original currency, allowing
repatriation of the capital.'1 Decision 24 also provides that a ceiling
of 14 percent of the foreign capital employed be imposed on the
remittance of profits.'2 The intention was that earnings above that
limit be reinvested in a member country.1 26 Limitations on remittance
are necessary to keep profits within the country for reinvestment.
Decision 24 has since been modified by Decision 46, the Uniform
Regime on Multinational Enterprises. Decision 46 allows multinational corporations to participate in the reserved sectors described in
Decision 24.127 Decision 46 thus effectively allows a wider degree of
foreign participation than did the original Decision 24. 128 Furthermore, while Decision 24 limited participation to no more than 20
percent foreign shares, Decision 46 raises that limit to 40 percent.
On May 12, 1987, the Andean Pact countries adopted fundamental
revisions to the 1969 Cartagena Agreement. 29 The new basic agreement, the Quito Protocol, still requires ratification by the members.13 0
However, certain provisions have been adopted by member nations
for immediate use; among them are provisions concerning foreign
investment in Andean Pact countries.' 3 ' The new Quito Protocol calls
for a weakening of common rules on foreign investment such that

resources. Parallel principles apply to public services, including Mexican banks. Latin Americans
greatly fear foreign control of their banks and exclude this sector from foreign investment.
With regard to protecting communications, the main concern is keeping politics free from
undue foreign influence. Id. at 23-24.
120. Id. at 23-24.
121. Huelin, supra note 111, at 21.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 23.
124. Id. at 27-29. The Decision provides that "foreign investments liquidated by the sale
of shares to national investors may be freely remitted in the currency in which they origi" Id. at 27.
nated ....
125. Id. at 27.
126. Id. at 28.
127. Huelin, supra note Ill, at 28.
128. Id.
129. Andean Group Ministers Approve New Rules Diminishing Consensus on Trade, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 745, (June 3, 1987).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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individual member states will now be allowed to regulate foreign
32
investment within their borders.1
However, prohibitions on foreign investment within certain sectors
are still in force. 33 Governments of individual countries must decide
which sectors are appropriate for foreign investment in accordance
with Article 3 of Decision 220, which provides that: "[tihe member
countries will not authorize direct foreign investment in activities
considered properly managed by local existing companies.' 1 34 Individual members are left to decide what they consider "properly"
managed by local existing companies. 135 While this can be interpreted
as giving a wide range of control to individual countries, it can also
be interpreted as limiting the ability of that country to release control
to foreign investors of any company which is properly managed by
locals.
While Mexico did not sign the Cartegena Agreement, nevertheless,
the economic and political developments occurring in Mexico during
the Andean Pact's inception reflect similar concerns and attitudes.
The industrial goals remain the same - to develop a sufficient base
to achieve economic freedom. Like the other Pact countries, Mexico
is striving to export manufactured goods in order to escape reliance
on natural resource exportation. Only a few years after the Andean
Pact agreement was signed, Mexico enacted the nationalistic 1973
Foreign Investment Law.
2. National Foreign Investment Laws: The Experience in
Mexico
The 1973 Foreign Investment Law 36 (FIL), enacted to restrict37
foreign investment in Mexico, limits certain business investments.

132. Id. at 746.
133.

For example, the industries of telecommunications, natural extraction, banking and

insurance remain restricted areas of foreign investment. See Huelin, supra note 111 and
accompanying text.
134. Lindow, The Andean Pact Relaunched: Implicationsfor the United States; Treaty of
Cartagena, 10 Business America, Information Access Company, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Oct. 12, 1987 at 12.
135. Id.
136. Maviglia, supra note 106, at 281. The 1973 Foreign Investment Law is only restrictive
with respect to foreign direct investment in Mexico. Id. at 290. Articles 2 and 6 of The Foreign

Investment Law define foreign investment as that investment made by: foreign corporations,
foreign individuals, non-incorporated foreign enterprises, and Mexican entities under foreign
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The FIL prohibits investment in certain sectors reserved to the state. 38

While it restricts foreign investment in sectors targeted for private
Mexican investors, a limited amount of foreign participation is al-

lowed. 13 9 In all other sectors, foreign ownership is limited to 49

percent.' 40 The FIL also requires an authorization by the Mexican
government for any investment which allows a foreign investor to

acquire more than 25 percent of the equity, or more than 49 percent
of the fixed assets of a Mexican corporate entity.' 4' Thus, it can be
seen that the 1973 Foreign Investment Law was primarily concerned

with the retention of national control over key economic sectors.
On February 16, 1984, Mexico implemented the 1984 Guidelines

42

(Guidelines), a set of policies to be used in combination with the
FIL. The Guidelines allow up to 100 percent foreign investment in
certain industries not allowed under the FIL. 143 Some of the limitations and goals of the Guidelines can be interpreted as similar to
those of the Cartagena Agreement. As in the Cartagena Agreement,
the long-term goal of the 1984 Guidelines is to increase exports. The
Guidelines and the Cartagena Agreement seek to accomplish this
through the transfer of technology from foreign investors to Mexican
44
industry and by encouraging national technological development.'
Although the 1973 Foreign Investment Law is a restrictive framework governing all foreign investment in Mexico,145 in certain industries the Guidelines allow up to 100 percent foreign ownership. 46

control or with a majority of foreign capital. However, investments made by foreign individuals
living in Mexico as permanent residents are not considered to be foreign. Id. at 290 n.67.
137. Id. at 420. Limited businesses include: (1) areas such as mining (34%), autos (40%),
and all others where foreign investment is limited to 49% and foreign control is limited to the
percentage of total ownership; (2) petroleum and natural resource industries, both of which
are reserved to state ownership; and (3) communications and transportation, which are reserved
for private Mexican investors. Id. at 421.
138. Id. at 420-21.
139. Id. at 421.
140. Id.
141. Maviglia, supra note 106, at 291.
142. NATIONAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT COMMSSION OF Maxico, GUEmaINEs FOR FoREION
INVESTMENT AND OBJECTIVES FOR ITS PROMOTION (1984), reprinted in Maviglia, supra note 106
[hereinafter cited as 1984 Guidelines].
143. Note, Has Mexico Kept the Promiseof 1984? A Look at Foreign Investment Under
Mexico's Recent Guidelines, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J., 417, 418 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Mexico's
Recent Guidelines].
144. Note, Mexico's Recent Guidelines, supra note 138, at 419. See also Heulin, supra
note 112, at 22-23 (outlining Decision 24 involving basic principles in regulating foreign capital
investment).
145. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 445 n.6.
146. The 1984 Guidelines list priority industries that allow 100% foreign investment. The
list includes: the production of electric and nonelectric equipment and machinery, electronic
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Thus, the Guidelines would seem to mitigate the restrictiveness of
the FIL 47 Nevertheless, the FIL remains as Mexico's basic foreign
investment legislation. 48 The 1984 Guidelines are merely regulatory

provisions which stem from the FIL. 149 The Guidelines signal a change
of attitude in Mexico from a more restrictive investment environment

to one that is more open to direct foreign investment. 50 It remains
to be seen whether the 1984 Guidelines are only an interim measure
allowing 100 percent foreign investment that will soon close, or
whether Mexico is permanently abandoning restrictive foreign investment laws.
B.

Regulation of Swap Activities

The widespread use of debt swap transactions quickly generated
regulatory response from the debtor nations. These laws and regulations, imposing a variety of restrictions, have been criticized as

unnecessarily restricting investment. Commentators have stated that
internal controls and regulations, which operate to prevent the im-

mediate conversion of pesos to dollars, act as a drawback to debt
swaps . 5 1 Because investors can only use pesos, they are forced to

purchase locally made goods and equipment which are often inferior
to those the investor could have purchased and brought into the
debtor country for use. Nevertheless, the substantial government

equipment and devices, equipment and material for transportation, metal mechanics, the
chemical industry, other manufacturing industries, advanced technology, and the hotel industry.
Maviglia, supra note 107, at 296. For a further breakdown of each industry, see id. at 296
nn. 101-109.
147. See generally Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 445 n.6. (discussing the
change in attitude that the 1984 Guidelines seem to represent toward foreign investment in
Mexico).
148. The Guidelines do not repeal the 1973 Foreign Investment Law. In fact, the Guidelines
do not function as law at all, but rather as a policy decision. See id. at 445 n.6.
149. Id.
The Foreign Investment Commission has made this point clear.
While... direct foreign investment is welcome, it should be emphasized that the
National Development Plan states that the legislation on foreign investments and
transfer of technology provides, on the basis of nationalistic principles, an adequate
normative framework for a flexible orientation .... Consequently, the Federal
Government affirms that the law to Promote Mexican Investment and Regulate
Foreign Investment does not require modifications, since it adequately covers the
field of its regulation and likewise gives flexibility ......
Note, Mexico's Recent Guidelines, supra note 138, at 423-24.
150. Id. In issuing the 1984 Guidelines, the Foreign Investment Commission was careful
to reaffirm that the 1973 Foreign Investment Law was in no way changed or repealed by the
issuance of the Guidelines. Thus it would appear that the Mexican government is free to reevaluate its position regarding the desirability of increased foreign investment. Id.
151. Ollard, supra note 2, at 67, 73.
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interests affected by swap transactions have generated the enactment
of numerous laws restricting the use of swaps.
1.

The Liberal Swap Program in Mexico

The Mexican legislative framework for debt swaps had its genesis
in Mexico's 1985 Restructuring Agreement. 5 2 Clause 5.11 of the
Restructuring Agreement 153 provided the legal authorization necessary
to convert Mexico's public debt into public and private capital

investment.1 54 Clause 5.11 is not legislation, but rather a part of an

agreement between Mexico and its creditors to encourage the devel-

opment of a swap program in Mexico.'

In accordance with Clause

5.11, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit 56 imposes a loss
percentage or discount rate on the debt to be swapped. The bank
must then reduce the loan repayment amount by this percentage. The
discount varies depending upon the industry involved,' 57 ranging from
0 percent for industries which the government wishes to promote, to

25 percent for those which are not a government priority.158

152. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 444.
153. Id.
154. Id. See also Pando, supra note 9, at 219 n.289.
Section 5.11 applies to exchanges of Qualified Capital Stock, Qualified Debt or a
Qualified Investment. 5.11 (a) Qualified Capital Stock is defined as "capital stock
of any Mexican public sector entity or Mexican private sector company .... (i)
which is issued in registered, certificated form .... ." Qualified Debt is defined as
"indebtedness of any Mexican public or private sector entity. . . ." "Exchanges of
advances for qualified capital stock are subject to all required Mexican governmental
authorizations, including authorization by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit,
The National Commission of Foreign Investment and the Ministry of Foreign
Relations of the United Mexican states. Id.
155. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 445.
156. Id. at 449. The Ministry of Finance and Public Credit represents the government of
Mexico as the obligor in all aspects of the debt/equity transaction. Id. at 456.
157. Balmaseda, supra note 18, at 7-8.
158. Recent Development, Int'l Debt, supra note 1, at 511.
Use of Investment
Companies owned by the Government and which the Government has decided to sell
Companies the production of which derived from the new investment is destined to export at least 80%, or small or medium
sized companies
Companies engaged in the development of activities of prime
importance and which generate jobs and foreign currency
Companies with minority or no foreign capital that some other
benefit to the Mexican economy is produced, such as exportation
of 30% of the new production

Discount
Percentage
0
5

8
12
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The Mexican government has also published an Operations Manual
which is a set of administrative rules to be used in accordance with
the 1973 Foreign Investment Law.'5 9 The Operations Manual gives
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit the power to authorize or
deny the use of the swap transaction once an analysis of the risks
and benefits of that particular transaction has been made. 16
To implement the swap, two approvals are required; one from the
National Commission of Foreign Investment 6' and the other from
the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit. The Commission weighs
the costs and benefits of the proposed transaction.162 The Commission
must rule on the proposed swap and issue an opinion within five
63
days of receiving the application.
In a Mexican swap transaction the investor exchanges credits' 64 for
"Qualified Stock Capital," which is stock in Mexican public-sector
entities, subject to certain qualifications.165 Mexico also limits an

Reduction of liabilities with domestic suppliers

14

Payment to FICORCA or Mexican government banks for Habiities in Mexican currency
Projects that do not represent a special benefit for the economy
of the country

16
25

Balmaseda, supra note 19, at 7-8.
Priority is given to debt conversions which benefit Mexico. Examples of activities which are
considered beneficial are as follows: any activity which increases exportation, expansion of the
productive capacity of subsidiaries, those that transfer advanced technology, those projects in
which the degree of domestic integration exceeds the general level of the economic line in
question, those projects with 100 percent foreign capital, and small and medium sized
companies. Id. at 3-4.
159. Id. at 447.
It is interesting to note that although swap transactions do not abrogate existing law in
Mexico, neither are they indicative of a permanent change in Mexico regarding foreign
investment. Id. at 446-47. There does not seem to be any broad legislation in Mexico indicating
that foreign investment is now favored. The Operations Manual is prepared by the Ministry
of Finance and Public Credit and the National Commission of Foreign Investment. Pando,
supra note 11, at 219.
160. Balmaseda, supra note 18, at 2.
161. This is required by General Resolution No. 5 of the Comision Nacionalde Inversiones
ExtranjerasDiario Oficial, Dec. 5, 1985. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 445
n.5. The Commission of Foreign Investment has a duty to enforce Mexico's foreign investment
laws. Id. at 447.
162. Id. Factors taken into consideration by the Commission include: (1) outside sources
of resources used in the debt swap; (2) whether the proceeds from the transaction are used to
increase productive investment; (3) the degree of inflation caused by the program to date; and
(4) that the transaction benefit all parties involved. Id.
163. Id. at 449. Variations to this basic procedure exist with regard to special circumstances.
164. A credit is a loan in which a group of financial institutions makes funds available on
common conditions to a borrower. Goodman, The Pricing of Syndicated Eurocurrency Credits,
FED. REs. BD. N.Y.Q. Rnv. 39 (1980).
165. Recent Development, Int'l Debt, supra note 1, at 511. There are five conditions which
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investor's ability to circumvent currency exchanges and repatriation
of capital.1 6s Transactions which do not permanently add to Mexico's
capital stock are not allowed. An unfortunate corollary of this

requirement is to preclude the use of swap transactions to finance
working capital. 67
In the past, swaps in Mexico were limited to investments by foreign

entities. 68 Although this restriction has been lifted under Clause 5.11,
no legal framework has been included in the Operations Manual, so
that in effect, Mexicans are still barred from participation in the
69
program. 1
As Mexico implemented the first formal swap program, it provided

the model from which others have patterned their programs. Mexico
opened its doors to swaps in hopes that it would reduce the amount

of Mexico's outstanding debt. Although swaps have relieved only a
relatively small proportion of this debt, 170 it is hoped that swaps have

encouraged additional amounts of foreign investment.
However, Mexico's model has not proven to be perfect. On the
contrary, due to its propensity to cause inflation, the swap program

has been suspended twice in Mexico. 171 Although the Mexican regulations prohibit the transfer of equity to any Mexican entity or

individual for a period of 12 years, 172 the regulations fail to govern
the repatriation of profits. Profits, though not guaranteed, are freely
remittable to the investor's country once dividends are declared.
must be met for the stock to be considered Qualified Capital Stock:
The shares must be issued in the name of the foreign entity, they are not to be
transferred to any Mexican citizen or entity for a period of 12 years, they cannot
be redeemed on terms which are more favorable to the investor than the terms of
credit for which they were exchanged, the shares are not to be guaranteed dividends,
and are not to be converted to securities other than other Qualified Capital Stock.
Id. at 511-12. The 12 year prohibition on transferring shares to Mexican entities or individuals
is designed to prevent investors from exchanging the stock into pesos and then back into
dollars, thus preventing any arbitrage profits. Id. at 511 n.38.
166. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 447.
167. Conrow, supra note 48, at 25.
168. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
169. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 453-54. Although there has been
controversy surrounding the allowance of Mexican nationals to participate in swap transactions,
it appears that nationals will be allowed to participate in the new swap program of 1988.
Some of the arguments against allowing participation of Mexican nationals are that the swap
program allows Mexican nationals a discount on domestic investments they would have made
anyway. Further, this discount would act as a reward to those same nationals who are guilty
of exporting money out of Mexico at the begging of the debt crisis. Id. at 453, n.65.
170. By 1987, swaps had provided only $1.1 billion U.S. in debt relief for Mexico. House
REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AuTo~iTy, supra note 7, at 87. Mexico's
outstanding debt at that date stood at $104.4 billion. Id. at 85.
171. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 452.
172. Id. at 450.

280
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Furthermore, Mexican regulations allow for the issuance of common
voting stock as Qualified Capital Stock, thereby relinquishing control
in those entities that are owned by a majority of foreign investors.
In short, although Mexican regulations require the initial investment funds from swaps to remain in the debtor country for a period
of time, the profits from these investments can be remitted to the
investor's home country. This counteracts the goal of expanding the
manufacturing bases necessary to become self-sufficient. Furthermore, while types of industries are limited and various levels of
ceilings on foreign ownership are imposed, the shares issued are
common stock which carry voting rights. This enables a foreign
investor to obtain control over the entity involved. As foreign investors continue to gain control over more and more single entities, the
cumulative effect can be that foreign investors achieve majority
holdings of Mexican industries.
The Restrictive Brazilian Regulatory Scheme
In 1984, Brazil imposed severe restrictions on swap transactions
by implementing Circular 1125.173 Issued by the Central Bank, Circular 1125 banned debt swaps that involve third parties' 74 and imposed
severe restrictions on other debt swap transactions.175 Swaps could
only be implemented if specified conditions were met. First, Circular
1125 limited the parties that could be involved in the swap. The
swap was only allowed if the original parties to the debt were
involved. 176 This limitation effectively banned third party transactions.
The swap transactions were approved by the Central Bank only on
a case-by-case basis. 77 The investment had to remain in Brazil until
the maturity date of the original loan. 78 The transaction had to be
performed by a financial institution. 17 9 Finally, ownership of the
Brazilian entity was not to be transferred to a third party investor. 8 0
This last restriction prevented an investor from reaping arbitrage
8
profits. '
B.

173. Ashford, Brazil Plans for State Auctions, EtIROMONEY, Sept. 1987, at 93, 94 [hereinafter Ashford].
174. Id.
175. Business Perspective, Brazil, supra note 108, at 164.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Business Perspective, Brazil, supra note 107, at 164.
181. Arbitrage is defined as the simultaneous purchase in one market and sale in another
of a security or commodity in hope of making a profit on price differences in the different
markets. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 95 (5th ed. 1970).
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Two subsequent resolutions governing swaps have been enacted in
Brazil. The first, Resolution 1416 of the Central Bank of Brazil,
went into effect for a period of about two months beginning November 17, 1987.182 The Resolution required that the Brazilian foreign
debt be secured as a prerequisite to its conversion.' 83 As the international banking community was opposed to this securitization requirement, Brazil's National Monetary Council approved new swap
rules in Resolution 1460.18 Resolution 1460, approved on February
1, 1988, now regulates swap transactions in Brazil. 8 5 In an effort to
curb the inflationary aspects of swap transactions, under Resolution
1460, the Central Bank retains the power to set ceilings on the
86
amount of debt converted into equity.'
Three types of debt qualify for conversion under the new Resolution. The first type is the compulsory U.S. dollar deposit with the
Central Bank made under the so-called "Deposit Facility Agreements" (DFA). The deposit is executed between the Central Bank
and non resident creditor banks (i.e., "rolled-over" debt).8 7 Deposits
made under the Deposit Facility Agreements are converted by means
of a public auction which fixes the discount in the stock market. 8
After the auction occurs, the cruzado proceeds from the auction are
invested in one of three options: 1) capital of new companies; 2)
capital of existing companies; or 3) Foreign Capital Conversion
Funds.189

The second type of debt which qualifies is represented by voluntary
deposits with the Central Bank made pursuant to previous resolutions. 19 Finally, the third type of qualifying debt is one which has
yet to mature. 191 These second and third types of debt are not

182. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 846-47.
183. Id. "Securitization" involves the "issuance of bonds" (vis-a-vis cash) to the foreign
creditors holding the debt to be converted into equity. The foreign creditors defer the receipt
of the discounted value of their credits. Id. at 848. This provision was dropped in Resolution
1460. Id. at 848.
184. Id. at 846-47.
185. Id. at 847.
186. Id.
187. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 847.
188. Id. There are two types of auctions. One for investments that are to be made in the
less developed areas of the country such as the Sudam and Sudene areas; and the other for
investment in other areas of the country. Id.
189. Id. These funds act like mutual funds and are managed by the Brazilian stock market.
Id. It appears that the government of Brazil prefers the Foreign Capital Conversion Funds
because dividends from these funds are subject to a reduced withholding income tax rate. Id.
190. These resolutions are Nos. 230 and 432. Id.
191. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 847.
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converted by auction, but may be converted privately. 192 The discount
rate for their conversion is set by the Central Bank. 193
The regulations governing swap activity currently in place in Brazil
promote direct foreign investment without relinquishing control of
Brazilian entities. Both Resolutions 1416 and 1460 require that converted proceeds remain in Brazil for a period of at least twelve
years. 19 4 This provision ensures that swap proceeds remain in the
economy 95 where they may be used to help fuel economic growth.
Both Resolutions mandate that debt may not be converted into equity
of companies that have repatriated capital during the three years
prior to the swap unless the repatriated amount has returned to
Brazil. 96 This provision is aimed at deterring capital flight of the
funds involved. 97 Most importantly, both Resolutions mandate that
converted debt may not be invested in such a way that companies
presently controlled by Brazilian residents would be transferred to
non residents. 98 Control is maintained by transferring preferred, non
voting stock rather than common stock. 99 This provision is crucial
to the maintenance of control over Brazilian entities by Brazilian
nationals which in turn allows Brazil to maintain greater control over
its economic decisions. 20 0 Finally, the converted debt invested into
the Foreign Capital Conversion Funds is limited to 5 percent of the
voting capital or 20 percent of the total capital of the Brazilian
company. 20' Under the new conversion plan, the role of brokerages
in executing the debt swap transactions will be greatly reduced. 20 2 In
effect, the Central Bank will act as broker.2 3
C. Mexico and Brazil Compared: Approaches to Regulating
Investment and Swap Transactions
Although Brazil and Mexico have both implemented swap programs, the approach each country has taken in formulating their
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 847.
197. See generally Business Perspective, Brazil, supranote 107, at 164. Regulations imposed
in Brazil require that the entity acquired through the use of the swap mechanism not be
transferred to a third party in order to control problems of capital flight. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 165.
200. Id.
201. Baker & McKenzie, supra note 13, at 847. Currently, projects applied for in Brazil
under the new conversion plan totals $457 million. Ashford, supra note 184, at 94.
202. Id.
203. Id.
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program differs not only in the basic structure of the regulations
used, but also in what the regulations are meant to encourage or
deter. 2 4 Mexico actively seeks swap transactions and remains receptive
to them. 205 Brazil has been much more cautious in its approach to
the implementation of a swap program.20 6 As a result, Brazil's
regulations governing swaps are much more restrictive in nature. 20 7
A key difference between the two sets of regulatory systems is how
they differ with regard to the relinquishment of control over the
business entities involved. Mexico's regulations allow the exchange
of common voting shares for retirement of outstanding debt.2 8 For
those sectors where 100 percent foreign ownership may be obtained
through swap activities, those business entities become subject to
complete foreign control.2 0 Because foreign investors can gain and
maintain this control, Mexico's current domestic investment policy
appears to be contrary to the goals set out in the Andean Pact. 210 In
comparison, Brazil issues non voting preferred shares in their swap
transactions.2 11 This allows Brazil to maintain control over business
entities involved in swap transactions, therefore, the entity remains
Brazilian in effect. Brazil's emphasis on maintaining control of their
industries is in alliance with the goals set out in the Andean Pact. 212
It remains to be seen how much change Decision 220 of the Quito
Protocol 2 3 will bring about in foreign investment. Although Decision
220 appears to ease the implementation of debt swap transaction
programs, 2 4 individual sectors may still be reserved for national
investment. 215 Decision 220 allows member countries to adopt either
a liberal interpretation of its language, enabling a member country
to implement a less restrictive swaps program, 21 6 or a more restrictive

204. See supra notes 155-98 and accompanying text.
205.
206.

See supra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.

207. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text. See also notes 208-12 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
210. This follows as Mexico allows 100% ownership while the Andean Pact stresses national
control. See infra notes 218-22.
211. Business Perspective, Brazil, supra note 107, at 165. Brazil uses preferred non voting
shares. Id.
212. Brazil uses non-voting preferred shares in its swap transactions. Brazil, supra notes

119-120 (discussing Latin American goal of maintaining control over economic sectors).
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra notes 120-35 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.

1989 / Debt-For-Equity Swaps
reading of its language, allowing a country to strictly regulate swap

activities .217
As the Cartagena Agreement1 8 is still in effect, and if the 1984
Guidelines 2 9 have the force of law, a conflict in goals is apparent.
This is so as the Cartagena Agreement stresses national control over
manufacturing sectors 220 while the Guidelines allow for the loss of
such control over these sectors in favor of foreign investment, to
encourage economic growth.221 Thus, if foreign control is found to
lead to instability, Mexico may face difficult choices in the years
ahead.2n
IV.

RESPONSES TO THE SwAP MARKET: INVESTORS AND

HoME

THEm

COUNTRY REGULATIONS

With the increasing popularity and rapid growth of debt swapping,
and the implementation of regulations imposed by debtor countries,
investors, banks and their home country governments have reacted
with a variety of responses.22 In some creditor countries, regulations
have been adjusted in order to allow enough flexibility in foreign
investment laws to encourage swaps without causing instability in the
banking and economic systems of the debtor nation.?2 Bankers and
investors have scrambled to find the most lucrative avenue available
to turn outstanding debt into money. 225 The ramifications of these
actions must be considered prior to executing a swap agreement.
A.

CreditorHome Country Regulations: The U.S. Approach

In response to the looming problem of potential default and its
impact on the banking industry and the national economy, the Federal

217. Id.
218. The Cartagena Agreement is part of the Andean Pact. See supra note 102.
219. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 117-18, 121-26 and accompanying text.
221. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 115.
222. It should be noted also, that both the present swaps activity and the Guidelines seem
to reflect less concern on the part of Mexico regarding foreign ownership and control than
has been evidenced by the Andean Pact and its ancillary rulings. See supra notes 114-17 and
accompanying text.
223. See infra notes 226-45 and accompanying text.
224. See notes 222, 226 and accompanying text for an example of US Regulations allowing
increased flexibility in debt swaps.
225. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
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Reserve Board 22 6 of the United States has recently enacted liberalized

regulations regarding swaps. The new regulations allow banks to hold
a greater percentage of shares in non financial foreign companies. 227
Prior to the recent amendment, Regulation K of the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1982 limited investments abroad to activities of a
banking nature. 252 The amendment allows banks to invest in a maximum of 40 percent of the shares of a private sector foreign company.229 The amendment further limits prospective transactions by

prohibiting U.S. banks from holding more than 25 percent of a
private sector, non financial foreign company's voting shares. However, the bank may invest in more than 25 percent as long as that
company has a larger shareholder who is unaffiliated with the bank.230
Although there are exceptions to Regulation K, the amount of the

ceiling on share ownership remains limited. 23' The new regulations
allow banks to acquire up to 100 percent of any non financial public
entity that is being privatized through the use of swaps .2 2 In short,
226. The Federal Reserve Board is one of the federal banking regulators along with the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
The Federal Reserve Board examines policies of U.S. bank portfolio diversification to minimize
risk both domestically and internationally. The Federal Reserve Board also regulates the
investments that U.S. banks make. Lindow, supra note 134, at 12.
227. Announcements, 74 FED. REs. BuLL., 232 (April 1988) [hereinafter Announcements].
228. Evans, supra note 23, at 86. The Bank Holding Act was enacted under 12 U.S.C.
1842(a), 1843(c)(8), and 1843(c)(14). Regulation K was enacted under C.F.R. §§ 211.3(a),
211.4(c), 211.5(c), and 211.34. Before its amendment, effective February 24, 1988, Regulation
K mandated that if a U.S. bank wanted to make an investment in the voting stock of a
foreign entity in excess of 50%, that entity had to have at least 95% of its assets involved in
permissible activities such as commercial, financial, and leasing operations. Announcements,
supra note 227. See also Evans, supra note 23, at 86-87. Regulation K further stated that a
bank could invest in any type of entity, regardless of its activities, as long as the stock owned
by the investing company represented less than 20% of the entity's voting stock. Evans, supra
note 23, at 87. Before being amended in 1988, the regulation had already allowed banks to:
(1) reduce exposure by selling debt to other investors, or (2) take advantage of debt/equity
swaps for up to 25% of non-financial companies. Announcements, supra note 227.
229. Announcements, supra note 227. Some investor banks in the United States are irritated
at the interference to free trade that Regulation K imposes. Evans, supra note 23, at 87. One
means of avoidance has been through purchasing preferred, non-voting shares of stock rather
than common voting shares. Id. However, the Federal Reserve has ruled that a U.S. bank
may not hold more than 25 percent of a company's shares, although it is a mixture of nonvoting and voting stock. Id. Brazil is presently issuing non-voting, preferred shares in its debt/
equity transactions. Business Perspective, Brazil, supra note 107, at 165.
230. Announcements, supra note 227, at 232.
231. Evans, supra note 23, at 91. One such exception to regulation K allows the exchange
of debt that was previously contracted for equity. However, the equity interest cannot exceed
a five year period even though most debt/equity transactions mandate that the investment be
held for at least a ten year period. Id.
232. Announcements, note 227. The February 1988 amendment to Regulation K has also
lengthened the permissible holding period, allowing the investor to hold the investments made
through swaps for a two-year period beyond which full repatriation of investment is restricted
by the debtor country up to a maximum of 15 years. Id. Once the investment exceeds 1% of
the bank's equity capital or $15 million, notice of swap activity must be given to the SEC.

Id.
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while the regulations impose limitations on the amount of foreign
ownership, in the case of a swap, they allow up to 100 percent
ownership. This provides incentive for banks and investors to utilize
swaps to maintain control over foreign investments which are otherwise heavily restricted.
These regulations allow increased investor control over foreign
direct investment by broadening the types of investments allowed to
include non financial entities. In addition, by allowing up. to 100
percent ownership, foreign investors can purchase an entire industry
of the debtor country, thereby controlling that industry. Finally,
changing the debt from public to private eliminates the pressure on
a creditor or its country to use direct political instruments and
solutions against a debtor country to cure default.
Swaps as an Alternative to Losses on the Secondary Market
Further providing incentive for banks to consider swap transactions
has been the rapid increase in the discount rate offered to investors
of Latin American debt. 231 As banks have grown more anxious about
holding large amounts of Latin American loans, they have taken the
opportunity to sell them on the secondary market. 2 4 This means that
the number of Latin American loans on the secondary market is
increasing. Without a matching increase in demand for these loans,
the market becomes one where everyone wants to sell and no one to
buy. The price on the market is then forced down, and the banks
lose still more money when they eventually sell these loans. 235 Due
to the questionable recoverability of these debts, the price on the
secondary market has been discounted at a greater percentage than
the discount demanded by the debtor nation. 2 6 Therefore, banks
turn to direct swap transactions with the debtor country in order to
recover a greater percentage of their loan.
B.

C. An Increase in Involuntary Lending
Involuntary lending occurs when a bank is "forced" to loan
additional funds to a debtor nation in order to ensure that the debtor
233. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 134.
234. The secondary market generally consists of private or secondary institutional purchasers
who purchase outstanding loans from the banks at a discount. HousE REPORT ON AN
INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AToRrnT, supra note 7, at 80.
235. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 134.
236. For example, a $100,000 loan held by the bank may be purchased by a third party
for as little as $50,000. By swapping with the debtor nation, even where the discount is at its
highest rate of 25%, the bank will receive $75,000 worth of shares.
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nation is able to maintain its interest payments on prior loans. 237
Voluntary lending has declined severely since 1984. 238 World Bank
President, A.W. Clausen, has warned that commercial lending to
large debtor nations could drop by as much as 50 percent during the

next decade. 2 9 An increase in loan-loss reserves represents an expectation that banks may not be able to recover money loaned to large

debtor nations.m There is speculation that present loan-loss provisions are insufficient at 25-30 percent of the total loans to debtor
nations.2U As fresh capital decreases, banks holding existing notes

are "forced" to lend more money to Latin American countries to
242
ensure the viability of their loan repayments.

D.

Investors Fight Back With the "Informal"
In response to the increased restrictions imposed by both debtor

and creditor nations, a new type of swap has emerged in Brazil called
an "informal." 243 The informal is basically an unauthorized swap
which, so far, has been tolerated by the Central Bank of Brazil 2
ostensibly because of its role in the reduction of debt. s The restrictions which a debtor country places on repatriation of capital and

profits, on industries that may be invested in, and on the percentage
of ownership allowed are circumvented by the use of informals.

237.

Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 131.

238.

JOINT REPORT ON EcoNoMIc DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,

supra note 58, at 41. Since 1984, debt service on private loans has increasingly exceeded the
amount borrowed. See Interparliamentary Conference, supra note 25, at 220 (table indicating
debt flow from 1981-1987).
239. Id. at 160.
240. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 132. In May of 1987, Citicorp increased its loan-loss
reserves by $3 billion. Chase Manhattan followed suit at $1.6 billion, followed by Bank of
America, Chemical Bank, and Manufacturers Hanover each at similar amounts. Id.
241. 25%-30% represents the present level of loan-loss reserves after the increases by
Citicorp, et al. Id. at 134.
242. See id. at 131.
243. Cohen & Michaels, supra note 5, at 18. For example, where a Brazilian company has
$100 million in debt about to mature to a U.S. bank, instead of depositing the cruzado
equivalent into the Central Bank as it would have previously done, it pays the cruzado
equivalent of $90 million U.S. to an agent. That agent then buys U.S. dollars on the black
market obtaining $60 million. The agent then pays the U.S. bank $59 million ($11 million
more than it would have gotten on the secondary market at 48-cents-to-the-dollar). Id. at col.
1. These unauthorized swaps have converted $2-$3 billion of debt. Id.
244. Id. The interest in "informals" stems from the fact that the transaction costs less to
all parties. The creditor is allowed more than the amount obtained on the secondary market
(currently 48-cents-to-the-dollar), and the cost to the debtor is less than it would be if it went
through the official channels. Id.
245. Id. However, recently the Central Bank has tried to impose restrictions that make the
transactions more traceable, by mandating that the cruzado payments of maturing debt be
deposited into bank accounts. Id.
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Some of these informals, however, allow investors to make quick
profits without creating any productive investment.2 This occurs
through "roundtripping", where an investor exchanges the dollardenominated debt for local currency at the discounted rate and then
exchanges the currency for dollars at the official rate which is
247
higher.
The problem with the informal market is three-fold. First, by
allowing repatriation of profits, investors can freely remit profits to
their home country, 248 therefore, no fresh capital is generated to fuel
economic growth. Second, if voting shares are exchanged instead of
the non voting interests required by the Brazilian conversion program,
the "informal" facilitates the loss of control over locally owned
companies which the government seeks to maintain.249 Finally, disclosure is difficult to enforce in an informal market, adding to risk
for investors in an informal swap. 250 Thus, the existence of the
informal market circumvents nationalistic interests of the debtor
nation and increases the instability of participating firms.

V. THE CosTs AND BENEFITS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DEBTOR
NATIONS, BANKS, AND TiRm PARTY INVESTORS

Since their inception, significant questions have arisen regarding
the costs and benefits of swaps. These questions must be addressed
if swaps are to continue in the long-term.
A.

The Benefits of Swaps: Both Real and Perceived
1. Benefits to the Foreign Investor

For the foreign multinational investor, the benefits from swap
transactions are dependent largely upon the ability to purchase debt
at a discount which fluctuates from 40 to 50 percent of the face
value.Y' The investor then exchanges the debt for equity in the debtor

246. Cohen & Michaels, supra note 5, at 18.
247. HOUSE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AuTHoarry, supra note 6,
at 92.
248. Ollard, supra note 2, at 69.
249. Maintenance of control is an important goal under the Andean Pact. Huelin, supra
note 111. As Brazil exchanges preferred non voting shares in swap transactions, control remains
with the original owners. Business Perspective, Brazil, supra note 107.
250. See generally disclosure requirements imposed by Regulation K, supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
251. Balmesada, supra note 18, at 2.

The TransnationalLawyer / Vol. 2

country's industries, subject to the discounts imposed by the debtor
nation's government. 2 2 This allows the multinational investor to make
an investment that may otherwise have been prohibitive. The swap
is also perceived as useful to the multinational corporation that
wishes to inject fresh capital into its subsidiaries located within the
debtor nation. However, whether or not this capital is truly "fresh"
is questionable.Y53
2. Benefits to the Banks
For the banks, the benefit of debt swaps is the chance to recover
money from the debtor nation which may otherwise be unrecoverable.
Although the bank must write off the discount rate applied in the
transaction as a loss, if loan-loss reserves are high enough, the bank's
stability is not called into question. 254 When faced with the prospect
of default which would threaten the bank's solvency, the bank will
usually prefer to use the swap mechanism to relieve it of a portion
of its debt holdings even though it must write off a percentage of
the debt as a loss in the process.2 5-

3. Benefits to the Debtor Nation
The obvious benefit of swaps to the debtor country is the retirement
of a portion of their outstanding national debt for less than its full
amount .2 6 This in turn reduces interest payments, leaving the debtor
nation needing less foreign capital to service their debts. 2 7 This would
leave the debtor country more money to reinvest in increasing their
manufacturing base, thus fueling economic growth. As long as banks
and investors are willing to discount the indebtedness in return for
shares of foreign companies, this benefit will exist.
Another perceived benefit of the swap transaction is increased
foreign investment .2 8 Foreign investment is encouraged in Mexico by
the 1984 Guidelines259 in an effort to increase industrial develop-

252. Id. at 7-8.
253. See infra note 263-265 and accompanying text.
254. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 132.
255. Id.
256. Balmaseda, supra note 19, at 2. In Mexico the government has been able to convert
debts in foreign currency into Mexican pesos. Because Mexico has repeatedly devalued the
peso, this allows the government to repay fewer pesos at the maturity dates of the loan. Id.
257. Meltzer, A Way to Difuse the World Bomb, FoarTuN, Nov. 28, 1983, at 138, 143.
258. Comment, supra note 13, at 112.
259. Note, Mexico's Recent Guidelines, supra note 137, at 423.
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ment.2w Increased foreign investment would seem to be particularly
important in light of the disinclination of banks to lend money to
Latin American countries. 261 As fresh capital is thought necessary to
attain increases in economic growth, if banks lend less fresh capital,
swaps provide an alternative. 262
In determining whether capital is truly fresh, however, one must
consider additionality.263 Put simply, the question of additionality is
whether the "subsidy to direct investment provided as part of a
debt/equity swap actually calls forth additional investment," as opposed to investment which would have occurred anyway without the
discount. 264 If the investment would have been made without the
swap mechanism, the debtor country actually gives up hard currency
without reaping a benefit.2 6
One of the factors scrutinized by some debtor nations in the
determination of whether to implement a swap transaction is whether
266
the proposed project will transfer technology to the debtor country.
This goal is reflected in the Mexican 1984 Guidelines. 267 A consideration in this determination should be the appropriateness of the
technology transferred. There are different components of "technol268
ogy,"- with "production technology" being the most obvious form.2 69
Technology may include project design or even managerial systems.
These technologies allow national firms to produce a better or
different product or produce the same product more efficiently. 270 In
analyzing the costs and benefits of swap transactions in the longterm, governments must seek transactions which will enable a country
to meet its appropriate technological development goals.

260. Id. at 425.
261. HOUSE REPORT
at 90.

ON AN INTERNAToNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AUTHOR=TY,

supra note 7,

262. Voluntary lending has decreased since Mexico's announcement of suspension in 1982.
Kuczynski, supra note 25, at 130. See also Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 460.
263. HOUSE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIoNAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AUTHouR, supra note 7,
at 91.
264. Id.
265. Id. Brazil has hesitated involving itself in the debt/equity market as it believes that
the investments would be made even without the subsidy provided by the swap. Business
Perspective, Brazil, supra note 182, at 164.
266. Note, Debt for Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 448.
267. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 116.
268. JoINT REPORT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE DEBT PROBLEM,

supra note 58, at 176 (essay by Kristin Hallberg) Other technologies include enterprise
technology, research technology, financial technology and managerial skills. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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A third area where the interests of the debtor nation influence
swap transactions is the privatization of portions of a nation's public
industries. 271 Some countries pursue a policy of privatization in public
industries. 272 The debt swap is a particularly effective means of
privatization as it serves the collateral function of releasing the nation
from its foreign debt.2 73 Industries which transfer appropriate technology are likely to remain strong areas of debt swaps. 274 Thus,
industries which transfer product technology such as the auto industry
are likely to remain active in the swap market. Likely too are
industries which the government wishes to privatize. There may be
reasons for maintaining government ownership of particular industries in developing countries. 275 For instance, often the infrastructural
level is so inferior that if the government does not assume the
responsibility for providing services, the private sector can not provide
them either. 276 Therefore, the issue of privatization requires more
than a cursory glance.
In sum, it appears that benefits to the debtor nation do exist.
Swap transactions do retire a portion of a debtor's outstanding debt
which lowers that country's interest payments. However, although
these transactions result in increased foreign investment, it is possible
that many of these investments would have taken place regardless of
the presence of the swap mechanism. Swaps also facilitate the goal
of privatization. Finally, swap transactions can be used as a vehicle
for transferring appropriate technology to a debtor nation which
should result in an increase in the debtor country's manufacturing
base.

271. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 113 n.175. Privitization is the conversion
of ownership of state-owned entities to the private sector. It is believed that privitization
increases efficiency by increasing competition. Id.
272. Id. Privatization has been favored in the past, both by the International Finance
Corporation and by the Reagan administration. Id. Since the inauguration of President Bush,
the new administration has not indicated any change of this policy. However, among individual
Latin American nations, there has been extensive debate regarding the wisdom of the sale of
national industries. Kuczynski, supra note 25, at 138-39.
273. Debt swaps serve to privatize and relieve debt where the exchange involves a public
sector entity. Comment, Give Me Equity, supra note 13, at 113.

274.

See generally Maviglia, supra note 105, at 296 (one of the most important goals of

the 1984 Guidelines is to encourage national technological development through a transfer of

technology).
275.
276.

Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 138.
See id. at 138.
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B.

Costs
1. To the Banks/ Foreign Investor

The financial costs of debt swaps stand to increase due to newly
augmented disclosure requirements in investor home countries .277 One
area where this change is evident is in the home country regulation
of swap activities by banks. As loan-loss reserves are still considered
inadequate at 25 to 30 percent, 278 it is likely that banks will continue
to be regulated by their home country. At the same time, however,
in recognition of the plight of banks which hold large amounts of
foreign debt, the Federal Reserve Board has recently liberalized
regulations concerning swap transactions.2 7 9 Despite the trend toward
the relaxation of regulations, the Federal Reserve Board is likely to
continue to regulate U.S. banks involved in swaps and to call for
increased disclosure of swap transactions 8 0
Because the debtor country investment policies are unpredictable,
and their implementation is even more problematic, it seems difficult
to predict what policies will exist in the future. At present, Mexico
is welcoming investors interested in these transactions. However,
restrictive foreign investment laws are still in effect in Mexico.'
Should Mexico decide to change its investment policy, it could do
so easily. Swaps are not permitted by law in Mexico as they were
not implemented by legislation, 28 2 but rather, exist at the grace of
the Commission of Foreign Investment. 283 Both banks and multinational corporations should also be aware of the possibility of change
in investment laws in debtor nations regarding ownership limits and

277. See supra note 232.
278. Kuczynski, supra note 24, at 134.
279. See supra notes 227-32 and accompanying text (Regulation K amendment liberalization).
280. INTRPARLWIENTARY CONFERENCE, supra note 25, at 200 (essay by Wertman). See
also Alternative Policies for Managing the International Debt Crisis, Hearing before Joint
Economic Committee, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 14 (1986) (discussing the risks faced by banks
holding large amounts of Latin American debt).
281. Note, Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 444-45.
282. Id. at 445.
283. Id. The Mexican government adopted a swap program based on the 1985 Restructuring
Agreement under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit and the National
Commission of Foreign Investment. The swap requires an authorization by the National
Commission of Foreign Investment in accordance with Resolution 5 of the Diario Ofical. Id.
at 445 n.5.
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eligible industry sectors. For instance, should a particular investor
own 60 percent of the stock of a Mexican corporate entity, there are
unanswered questions regarding the stability of the investment if the
ownership percentage allowed in that investment is reduced. An
investor should also be aware of limitations on repatriation of capital
and profits. Most debtor nations severely restrict the time period
before which an investment may be liquidated and recouped. 2 4 An
investor should be prepared to accept a limitation on the repatriation
of profits as well. For example, Andean Pact members limit repatriation of profits to a set percentage. 2 5 The remainder must be
reinvested in the debtor nation. 28 6 Risks to the investor in Brazil are
similar, although Brazil is less receptive to swap transactions in
general. An investor in Brazil must be content to receive non voting
7
shares of equity. U
2. Costs to the Debtor Nation
Unfortunately, while there may be a variety of benefits to the
debtor nation arising from swap transactions, there are also numerous
problems. One of the disadvantages is the inflationary impact caused
by an increase in the money supply. 28 This increase occurs as a
natural consequence of the debtor nation printing up additional
currency for the redemption of the debt in a swap transaction. 28 9 As
there is no increase in real production, but only in the amount of
currency flowing into the market, inflation occurs. 29° There are
conflicting opinions regarding the inflation that swap transactions
produce. It has been suggested that if the country is illiquid, it would
be unwise to repay debts which would create inflationary pressures
in the economy. 291 However, some bankers take a different view
observing that if the new money injected into the economy, is used
2
to increase productive capacity, inflation will not occur. 9
284.

See generally JOINT REPORT ON EcONOIc DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
supra note 58, at 180 (essay by Kristin Hallberg) (discussing various methods
used by countries to repatriate capital).
285. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
286. Id.
287. See supra note 249 and accompanying text re:Brazil using non voting shares.
288. Note, Mexico's Recent Guidelines, supra note 138, at 439.
289. HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAOEMENT AuTHoRITy, supra note 6,
at 92.
290. Id.
291. Evans, supra note 23, at 94 (citing comments of Dornbusch, Professor of International
Economics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology).
292. Id.
DEBT PROBLEM,
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There has also been concern that swaps help accelerate the growth
of a nation's budget deficit. 93 It has been observed that where no
swap program is implemented, investment funds come into the country as foreign exchange. 294 With swaps, the funds come in as direct
foreign investment rather than as foreign exchange. If investment
funds are thus limited, the debtor nation's revenues may decrease. 295
Therefore, a swap program may result in lower foreign reserves, or
in a greater need for additional new funds. 295 The purchase of debt
by using local currency may increase debt service costs because these
processing costs are absorbed by the government of the debtor
country. 297 This increases government expenses, creating an obvious
adverse impact on the fiscal deficit. 298
A detrimental outgrowth of swap transactions is that swaps create
an incentive for more "capital flight," 299 which continues to plague
developing countries. 300 Capital flight occurs when dollars which have
been borrowed by debtor countries have been invested outside the
country rather than used to increase the productive capacity of the
debtor nation. 0'
Another fear of some debtor country officials is the occurrance of
roundtripping or the bicycling of funds. 30 2 Roundtripping occurs when
debt is bought by offshore dollars for less than the amount the
debtor nation discounts its debt in a debt swap. For example, for
$60 million, $100 million worth of Mexican loans can be purchased

293. HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AuTHORITy, supra note 7,
at 92.
294. Id. at 91.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 92.
297. Id.
298. HousE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT AUTHORrrY, supra note 6,
at 92.
299. Zamora, Mexico and the Global Financial Market: Capital Flight as a Factor in
National Policy Making, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 35, 36 (1987) [hereinafter Zamora]. To a
large extent, Mexico's external debt was lost to capital flight. Although the exact figure is
argued, it is agreed that a large percentage of the dollars borrowed by Mexico were used to

finance investments in countries other than Mexico. Capital flight is both difficult to quantify
and to define. Economists vary in their definitions from an expansive view of "both reported
and unreported acquisition of foreign assets by the nonbank private sector ... " to a narrower
view of unrecorded capital outflows. Id. at 38.
300. Capital flight continues to plague developing nations. Id.
301. Zamora, supra note 299, at 36. Although estimates of capital flight have varied for
the period from 1977-1984, the Central Bank of Mexico indicates that at least $33 billion were

lost to capital flight during that same period. Morgan Guaranty Trust estimates that approximately $50 billion were lost to capital flight in Mexico during the period 1977-1987. Id. at
39.
302. Evans, supra note 23, at 110.
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on the secondary market. 33 The bank or multinational could then
take advantage of the swap mechanism in place to get $80 million
in local currency for the $100 million loans.3°4 The local currency
could then be used for local investment (which may be promptly
sold) or could be exchanged on the black market for dollars and
taken out of the country. 0 5 As a result of roundtripping, currency
leaves the country adding to the problem of capital flight.
Another consideration from the debtor nation's perspective is that
of loss of ownership. Perhaps the most significant aspect of loss of
ownership is the question of control. From the debtor nation's
perspective, it may be undesirable for foreign countries to be allowed
3 6
to buy controlling shares of large industries in the debtor nation.
This occurs where the equity shares involved in the swap transaction
carry voting rights, 3 7 since control over key economic decisions
concerning that industry may be taken away from the debtor and
given to the creditor. The goals of the Andean Pact through the
Cartagena Agreement emphasize the desire to maintain control over
key manufacturing sectors of the economy. 308 Debt swaps conflict
with this desire for control as the swap may create a majority of
ownership and control in the foreign investor.
It would appear that the costs to the debtor nation may be high
enough to outweigh the potential benefits of swaps. Swap transactions
associated with the retirement of public debt increase the money
supply in the debtor nation and so are inflationary. 3 09 Although this
inflation can be curbed by setting a cap or ceiling on the amount of
swaps that are transacted within a given period, 10 the inflation
produced by swaps cannot be eliminated. In countries where the
inflation has reached triple digit figures, it hardly seems appropriate
to further fire inflation. Furthermore, swap transactions can result
in increased costs to debtor nations. 31' This increase in costs can
result in one of two ways: either through a decrease in foreign
exchange 31 2 or through internal processing costs absorbed by the
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1988 at, IIR, col. 1.
307. See supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
308. Id.
309. See HOUSE REPORT ON AN INTERNATIONAL DEBT MANAGEMENT
6, at 92.
310. See Debt-for-Equity Swaps, supra note 4, at 452.
311. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.

312. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
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debtor nation.31 3 Capital flight3 14 and roundtripping 15 remain a continuing problem of swap transactions. Finally, swaps may result in
of the economy key to
a loss of ownership and control in areas
316
economic decisions of the debtor nation.
SUMMARY
In sharp contrast to the Mexican regulatory scheme, Brazil's swap
program emphasizes maintenance of Brazilian control over its economic sectors. Brazil continues to achieve this control in its implementation of swap programs by allowing only non voting preferred
shares to be exchanged. Current resolutions in effect in Brazil require
that "no converted debt be invested in any manner which would
transfer control of companies presently controlled by Brazilian residents to nonresidents. ' ' 31 7 Thus, the Brazilian swap program can be
seen as in alignment with the goals of the Andean Pact.
Both the Brazilian and Mexican swap programs restrict the repatriation of capital. In Mexico, the entity invested in may not be sold
to a Mexican entity or individual; thus, the problem of capital flight
is prevented. Brazil maintains a similar restriction on transfer to
third parties. Both countries require that converted capital remain
within the country for a set number of years. This limits the options
open to an investor should the investment prove unprofitable. An
investor must wait for at least the specified time period before his
capital may be recouped. Although liberalized, some restrictions
remain on the industries eligible for investment and the percentage
of ownership permitted in these industries. In Mexico, restrictions
on permitted areas of investment are expressly imposed by the 1984
Guidelines and effected by the discount rate applied to the proposed
project. Latin American debtor nations are not alone in imposing
restrictions on Latin American investments.
Regulation K of the Bank Holding Act currently imposes restrictions on U.S. bank holdings in foreign countries both with regard
to the type of industry invested in and the shares purchased. However,

313. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 302-304 and accompanying text.
316. Consider the Mexican example where 10076 ownership is allowed in some sectors. See
generally Note, Mexico's Recent Guidelines, supra note 138. As Mexico uses common shares
in its debt/equity transactions, it follows that ownership and control in those entities is given
over to foreign hands.
317. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Regulation K presently allows up to 100 percent ownership in foreign
holdings in the case of a debt swap. This provides an incentive for
banks to utilize debt swaps to divest themselves of foreign debt
holdings.
In an effort to avoid regulations imposed by debtor nations on
repatriation of capital and profits, investors and debtors have begun
to engage in the unauthorized "informal" debt swap. Use of the
informal swap circumvents regulations and allows investors to freely
remit profits and capital to their home country, facilitates loss of
control to the debtor nation, and increases the risk involved for both
debtor and investor. Thus, it is likely that swap transactions will
continue to be highly regulated and that the informal market will be
prohibited.
The benefits of swaps are varied. The multinational investor benefits in the utilization of swaps to the extent that an investment may
be made at a savings. Further, the multinational corporation may
use these savings to inject fresh capital into an already existing
subsidiary located in the debtor nation. The primary benefit of the
swap transaction to the creditor bank is the opportunity to recover
a portion of an otherwise perhaps unrecoverable loan. The primary
benefit to the debtor nation is the retirement of a portion of their
outstanding debt for less than its face value. This allows the debtor
nation to reduce periodic interest payments.
In light of the reduced lending available to Latin American nations,
the debt swap is seen to be an important tool in promoting direct
foreign investment in Latin America. The question of whether in fact
the swap generates additional foreign investment is arguable. If the
investment would have been made without utilizing the swap mechanism, the debtor nation is giving up hard currency without reaping
a benefit.
Additional possible benefits of the swap mechanism are the transfer
of technology and the privatization of publicly held entities. The
swap may be used by the debtor nation to import technology appropriate to their needs. Privatization has been sought in Latin American
countries to increase competition and efficiency in the marketplace.
Swap transactions take the entity out of the hands of the government
and place it into private hands thus, facilitating this goal.
The costs associated with swaps, however, should not be ignored.
Swap programs are easily terminated" 8 and in fact have been sus318. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (discussing the more restrictive foreign
investment laws still in effect in Mexico).
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pended twice in Mexico due to their inflationary propensity. Brazil
remains less receptive to swap transactions in general. Both banks
and third party investors engaging in swap transactions should be
aware of the possibility of future changes in attitude in debtor nations
regarding foreign investment. Latin America has had a long history
of nationalistic regulations concerning foreign investment. It is unlikely that the tolerance of current swap activity represents a permanent change in attitude for Latin America in this regard. It is
also possible for investment laws in debtor nations to change ownership limits and eligible industries.
Perhaps the greatest risk to the investor lies in the possible ramifications of the swap to the debtor nation. Use of the swap creates
serious problems for the debtor nation involved. The swap remains
a highly inflationary mechanism and as a result, ceilings must be
imposed on the amount of swap transactions engaged in. The wisdom
of creating further inflation in economies which already experience
high rates of inflation is questionable both from the debtor nation's
perspective and from the perspective of the investor.
Swaps may actually exacerbate the already existing problem of
capital flight in Latin America. Where investors and debtors successfully circumvent regulations imposed by debtor nations on the
repatriation of capital, the proceeds from debt swaps are often taken
out of the country and invested elsewhere. Roundtripping and bicycling of funds allow investors to make quick profits without creating
any increase to the debtor nation's capital or manufacturing bases.
The greatest dilemma that swaps present to the debtor nation is
that of loss of control over industries in their economy. Brazil has
structured their swap program such that they do not encounter this
problem. However, the swap program in Mexico allows voting shares
of stock to be issued in the swap transaction. The Mexican program
also allows up to 100 percent foreign ownership. This may result in
a decrease in the ability of the debtor nation to address key economic
issues in the future. As control is lost by the debtor nation and
disseminated among foreign investors with competing interests, the
stability of the base economy is threatened and will most certainly
add to the problems faced by both the debtor nation and the foreign
investor.
CONCLUSION

The swap was conceived of as a clever international financial
instrument designed to achieve multiple objectives. The primary
299
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problem as perceived by both creditor banks and debtor nations was
the looming possibility of debtor default. Faced with an ever mounting foreign sovereign debt concentrated substantially in Latin America, creditor banks were confronted with several imponderables. If
the sovereign debtor nations defaulted on their loans, the consequences on the global banking industry could be devastating. Default
could trigger a run on banks in creditor countries leading to a
possible collapse of some of the largest banks in the world leading
to political upheaval. Furthermore, because of consistent use of crossdefault clauses in bank lending agreements to debtor nations, default
on one loan mandates default on all loans which would necessarily
imperil the stability of banks worldwide.
Default would prove equally disastrous for those debtor nations
which rely on continued lending to both service their debt and recycle
funds back into their economies. After such a default, new loans
would only be granted at exorbitant interest rates if at all. In light
of the adverse reactions of creditors upon payment moratoriums
declared by Latin American countries during the early part of this
decade, Latin America has come to realize that neither default nor
moratoriums are in their best interest. A way had to be found to
reduce their outstanding debt.
Because foreclosure on these loans could prove impossible and
most certainly would create political chaos, creditor banks have been
driven to the swap as an alternative mechanism for divesting themselves of risk-laden Latin American loans. Debtors, too, have anxiously sought for a method of reducing their debt servicing burdens.
By reducing the amount of total outstanding debt, swaps have been
perceived as one solution to the problem of default. Furthermore,
by utilizing the swap mechanism, debtor nations seek to increase
foreign investment. Third party investors have taken advantage of
the swap to make investments which otherwise could be prohibitive
or unavailable. While all parties involved anticipated considerable
benefits flowing from swaps, the unforeseen consequences have both
hindered their use and created pitfalls for the unwary.
One consequence has been the increasing complexity of the transactions. Not only must the parties be aware of home country regulations, they must also take into consideration regulations imposed
by the debtor nation involved. Debtor country regulations are often
imposed in a rapid ad hoc manner making it difficult yet crucial to
keep abreast of changes. Often, small regional banks have become
involved in contractual agreements using unfamiliar provisions such
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as cross-default clauses. Another potential problem occurs when these
banks invest in areas in which they have no expertise. Without careful
planning and an intimate knowledge of the transaction to be entered
into, the wisdom of the investment should be questioned.
A further consequence of the swap transaction is the tension created
between competing goals of debtor nations. The debtor nation is
often forced to pit their desire to maintain national control against
the need to relieve their debt burden and increase foreign investment.
This compels the debtor nation to change their policies in order to
accommodate multiple demands of the swaps and their parties.
Ironically, one last consequence of the implementation of swap
transactions is the switch in bargaining power. Where originally the
creditor set forth the terms of repayment and conditions for new
lending, now, the debtor controls. The banks cannot realistically
declare default without jeopardizing global economic stability due to
the existence of the cross-default clause. Furthermore, political ramifications prevent creditor banks from exerting pressures on the debtor
nations. This places the debtor nation in a position to demand what
discount rate will be applied and what industries the investor may
consider.
As the secondary market matures, it is likely that the price for
Latin American loans will rise making the investment less attractive.
On the other hand, this rise in price may be indicative of a less risky
investment. In that case, although it is probable that the numbers of
swap transactions will decrease, the long-term stability of the transaction and its consequent investment will increase. A further influence
on the future of the swap transaction is the direction that may be
taken by the debtor nation. While it appears that the swap program
in Mexico has been suspended due to its inflationary propensity, the
underlying concerns of foreign domination and tighter national control may dictate future restrictions and regulations.
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